



**Putin's External & Internal  
Security Policy**

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## **Incorporating Analysis of the Defence White Paper of 2003 and the Terror Attacks of 'Nord-Ost' and 'Beslan'**

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### **Key Points**

- \* Russia focuses on modern high-tech warfare and on asymmetric conflicts, instead of large-scale conventional wars.
- \* However, unless the current large-scale structure of the armed forces is changed the adaptation of the RF Armed Forces to modern warfare is likely to be hampered.
- \* The overall tone of the 2003 Defence White Paper is more moderate towards the West than the major security documents of 2000.
- \* However, an assertive attitude towards the West, a strengthening of Russia's position within the CIS and on a global level, and an emphasis on military means as an instrument of security policy are likely to remain Russian policy principles.
- \* The new National Security Concept-in-process will state that internal social-economic problems are the most complicated and urgent challenge for Russia.
- \* However, until now Russia's conservative security establishment has always been able to bypass a social-economic approach by putting a military approach to external as well as internal security on the agenda.

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**Table: Main Entries of the 2000 Security Documents &  
The 2003 Defence White Paper**

# **Putin's External & Internal Security Policy**

## **Incorporating Analysis of the Defence White Paper of 2003 and the Terror Attacks of 'Nord-Ost' and 'Beslan'**

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According to common accepted points of view, national security policy should reflect a coherent and consistent system of political, military, economic and psychological means that a state has at its disposal. This article presents an analysis of President Putin's security policy from 2000 to 2004 and beyond. It starts with a comparison between the most important entries on security policy of the 2000 editions of the National Security Concept (NSC), the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept. In October 2003 the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) published *The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation*, a document which can best be described and will be referred to as a 'Defence White Paper' (DWP). Following an assessment of the security documents of 2000 this article will compare these results with the contents of the 2003 DWP. The development and prospects of internal security policy will be analysed by the consequences of the hostage takings of Nord-Ost (2002) and Beslan (2004). Finally, based upon the available information of the revised NSC-in-progress, an outlook will be presented on Putin's security policy in his second term in office, after his re-election in March 2004.

The NSC was produced by the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) and provides an overall view of RF security policy, applying all means available to the state. The Military Doctrine was drafted by the MoD and deals with the military means of the state. The Foreign Policy Concept was drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del*, MID), and relates to the political and diplomatic means of the RF. Since the NSC is the principal security document, for reasons of unity and clarity the main entries of these three documents as well as of the 2003 DWP will be offered in the format of the NSC.<sup>1</sup> Thus the structure of this comparison of the security documents is divided into four parts: Russia in the world community, Russia's national interests, threats to Russia's security, and ensuring Russia's security.

### **Main Entries of the 2000 Security Documents<sup>2</sup>**

#### **Russia in the World Community: Destabilizing Factors**

A number of destabilizing factors are consistently mentioned in all documents:

- Dominance in the international community of Western states led by the United States;

- Unilateral power actions, bypassing the UN Security Council (UNSC), by using concepts such as 'humanitarian intervention' and 'limited sovereignty';
- (International) terrorism;
- Organized crime.

The enumeration of destabilizing factors demonstrates an emphasis on **external** aspects. Another striking feature is the prominence of negative tendencies with reference to Western security policy. Over the years in the three security documents more and more entries have been included related to this subject. In particular NATO's use of force in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) was seen as a clear example of its policy of ignoring Russia, which claimed a decisive role in Europe, as well as of disregarding the UN and the standards of international law. Other concerns were NATO's new Strategic Concept of April 1999 and its enlargement with new member states in the East, adjacent to Russia's borders.

**Internal** destabilizing factors seem to be of less importance. Terrorism and organised crime are included in all the documents. Two of the three documents mention illegal trade in arms and narcotics as well as nationalistic and religious strife as factors.

This leads to two conclusions. First, the contents of internal destabilizing factors are not consistent in the security documents. Apparently the security organs had different opinions on the domestic situation. Secondly, external destabilizing factors outweigh internal ones in RF security policy. The security organs obviously were more focussed on international developments.

### **Russia's National Interests**

The following national interests are prevailing in the documents:

- Primary interests are protection against (international) terrorism, disasters of natural or industrial origin, and the dangers arising from wartime military operations;
- Improving economic development and enhancing the standards of living;
- Preserving and strengthening the RF's sovereignty and territorial integrity and strengthening the basis of the constitutional system;
- Eliminating the causes and conditions contributing to political and religious extremism and ethno-separatism;
- Strengthening Russia's international position as a great power;
- Developing mutually advantageous relations, especially with the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS);
- Cooperation in the military-political area and in the sphere of security through the CIS Collective Security Treaty, particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism.

The national interests as listed are a mixture of provisions on **domestic** and **international** matters. Nowadays the perception that security is more than protection with military means against an external aggressor is widely accepted as realistic. 'Chechnya' has made clear to the RF authorities that not only **external** but also **internal** threats exist against national security and that these threats are not confined to the military dimension but also have their roots in political, social and economic dimensions. However, if the RF authorities had taken this interdependence between internal and external national interests seriously, this should have brought them to the conclusion that conflicts of the type of the Chechen war can not be solved by military means. Consequently, for ensuring a

consistent national security policy not only military and diplomatic means come to the fore, but also social (human rights), economic (development projects, building and maintenance of houses, schools and medical facilities) and political (reform of the bureaucratic apparatus) activities are essential. A stable economic development is a prerequisite for realizing these activities. These basic conditions are, in general terms, reflected in the 2000 editions of the NSC as well as of the Foreign Policy Concept. However, in Russian civic society they had not yet become visible. Probably, this was due to slow economic development but surely also to the continued presence of a deep rooted bureaucracy, which produced corruption. Therefore, the implementation of the aforementioned policy intentions in a broad spectrum of security aspects is likely to be a long-lasting process.

### **Threats to Russia's Security**

The RF sees the fulfilment of its political-strategic objectives as well as its internal and external security threatened by a number of causes. In discussing general roots of threats the NSC above all points out **internal**, socio-economic aspects: the poor status of the economy, a failing governmental apparatus, polarization between entities, (organized) crime, corruption and terrorism. These internal aspects are further elaborated in the enumeration of internal threats in the three security documents. Apart from internal threats these documents naturally also recognize **external** threats. When comparing the three documents the following threats are prevailing:

#### *Internal threats*

- Extremist national-ethnic and religious separatism and terrorism;
- Trans-national organized crime;
- Erosion of the territorial integrity of the state by separatist aspirations of a number of constituent entities of the RF, by poor organization of state control; and because of the links between some parts of the executive and the legislature and criminal organisations (corruption).

#### *External threats*

- Attempts to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for international security of UN and the OSCE, by economic and power domination of the United States and other Western states;
- Attempts to ignore (or infringe) RF interests and influence in resolving international security problems;
- The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all the expansion of NATO eastwards;
- NATO's practice of using military force outside the bloc's zone of responsibility without UNSC sanction.

### **Ensuring Russia's Security**

In this part of the documents the various policy dimensions come together. They consecutively portray the principles of socio-economic and domestic policies (fundamentals and objectives), as well as of foreign and security policies (military security, the use of force and the deployment of forces and troops abroad), for the purpose of achieving the objectives of Russia's grand strategy and of ensuring its national security. As a final point this part of the security documents presents a hierarchy of the institutions responsible for national security.

*Socio-economic and domestic policies*

- Decreasing Russia's economic dependency on other states by strengthening state regulation of the economy and by organizing a common economic area in the CIS;
- Improving the system of state power of the RF, its federal relations and its local self-government (constituent entities) to reinforce the social and political stability of society;
- Guaranteeing strict observance of the laws by all citizens, public servants, state institutions, political parties and social and religious organisations to diminish crime, corruption and terrorism;
- Adhering to the fundamental principles and rules of international law.

President Putin regards strengthening of central authority as the main solution for socio-economic problems. In his 'vertical' approach he has made an effort to enhance his grip on developments in these and other fields, by withdrawing power and influence from enterprises (especially of the oligarchs, who control vital areas of the economy) and from the constituent entities (governors of the regions) for the benefit of the Kremlin.<sup>3</sup> In this way Putin wanted to increase government revenues (taxes), to finance policy objectives such as the fight against crime and terrorism, as well as to enlarge the influence of the central apparatus on constituent entities, by deploying presidential plenipotentiaries at the regional level. Another objective of the installation of plenipotentiaries was to prevent or neutralize separatist movements.

It was doubtful that simply increasing central authority over the regions would result in improved relations between central and regional powers. Still, reinforcing central authority could also be beneficial for Russia. The RF is a state without a heritage of civic, democratic governance. Yeltsin's period of rule demonstrated that a vast and complicated country such as Russia without steadfast, centralised authority offers certain groups, such as oligarchs and regional governors, the opportunity to abuse power. On the other hand, centralization of power demands guarantees for a democratic development, in order to prevent totalitarianism. In this respect it is important to realize that since the introduction of the Constitution of 1993 the powers of the legislature to properly check the executive (president and government), have been restricted. Theoretically this could lead to unlimited and uncontrolled centralization of powers. This tendency was enhanced in autumn 2004. After the hostage taking in Beslan, in September 2004, Putin took the opportunity to further strengthen the centralised powers of the Kremlin, at the expense of the governors of the regions.<sup>4</sup>

*Foreign policy*

- Reinforcing vital mechanisms for multilateral management of international processes, above all under the jurisdiction of the UNSC;
- Partnership with all CIS member states, and development of integration processes within the CIS, as well as implementation of other objectives of Russia's interests about the CIS;
- Defending and guaranteeing the legal rights and interests of Russian citizens (compatriots) resident abroad or of the Russian-speaking population, in the CIS as well as in the Baltic states.

**Reinforcing mechanisms of international security.** The RF clearly rejects a leading role in international politics of other institutions than the UNSC. This provision of course is related to the objective of strengthening Russia's international position. In the UNSC the RF possesses the right of veto and is thus able to block

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undesirable resolutions. Therefore, the objective of reinforcing Russia's international status can be promoted within the constellation of the UN. However, if NATO dominates international politics, the situation would be different. In such an arrangement of the international system, the RF, without a veto right, would be more or less 'dependent' on NATO's policies. This explains the prominence of the UN and the UNSC especially in the relevant entries in the documents.

**Advancing regional stability.** In the practice of politics Russia's standpoints on good neighbourhood (partnership) and on regional conflict resolution in the CIS become confused. On some occasions the RF allegedly has actively encouraged regional conflicts, for instance in Abkhazia, followed by an offer of conflict solution, thus making a CIS state, in this case Georgia, dependent on Russia for ensuring its security. Subsequently, this dependency in the field of security was aimed at enhancing RF influence on this state, thus 'ensuring' good neighbourliness.

**Protecting Russians abroad.** This is a recurring theme of RF foreign policy. In the Foreign Policy Concept this provision is mentioned no less than four times: under the heading 'general principles'; under 'human rights and international relations'; and twice under 'regional priorities', in discussing relations within the CIS and with the Baltic states. The NSC as well as the Foreign Policy Concept, in describing the location of Russians abroad, use the term *za rubezhēm*. This term points at states adjacent to the RF. The expression *za rubezhēm* has an emotional connotation: it refers to something familiar, which binds together.<sup>5</sup> In the consecutive military doctrines a provision on the protection of Russians abroad is also included under the heading 'external threats'. In previous doctrines in describing 'abroad' the same expression was used as in the other two security documents: *za rubezhēm*. However, in the 2000 issue of the Military Doctrine this term has been changed into *inostrannykh*. *Inostrannykh* means out of the country in general, it has a neutral, dispassionate implication. Based upon the changed connotation of the term for 'abroad' in the Military Doctrine of 2000 the assumption could be made that the General Staff/MoD has become less willing to use force if necessary for the protection of Russian minorities in a foreign country.

### *Security policy*

With regard to security policy, analysis of the three documents presents three fundamental themes: ensuring military security, methods of using forces and troops and the deployment of forces and troops abroad. These themes generate the following entries, which are only mentioned in the NSC and in the Military Doctrine:

- All forces and facilities available, including nuclear weapons, will be used if necessary to repel armed aggression, if all other means have been exhausted;
- The RF must uphold nuclear deterrence;
- Forces and troops are employed in local, regional, international and large-scale conflicts, as well as for peacekeeping operations;
- The interests of Russia's national security may require a Russian military presence in certain strategically vital regions of the world.

**Ensuring military security.** The NSC and the Military Doctrine permit the use of nuclear weapons to counter aggression. However, the Military Doctrine is more outspoken in this respect: it allows for the use of nuclear arms to repel a conventional attack as well, under certain unspecified critical circumstances for national security. Conversely, the Foreign Policy Concept emphasizes the desire of declining the role of military power, mentioning reductions of conventional arms as well as of weapons of mass destruction, measures against proliferation of these



weapons and other aspects of arms control, such as confidence and security building measures. Consequently, in contrast to the other two documents, the Foreign Policy Concept regards nuclear weapons not primarily as a means of deterrence, but as an object of arms control. In this case the MoD, acting in its 'own' field, comes forward as the most aggressive institution with regard to military interests. This attitude is not unexpected, since a decline in the position of the military instrument of national security policy is likely to cause diminishing power and influence of the MoD as well.

## **Defence White Paper 2003: The Priority Tasks of the Development of the RF Armed Forces**

In analysing this document<sup>6</sup> I will not make a full comparison with the 2000 major security documents, but concentrate on some significant developments.

### **Characteristics of Current Wars & Armed Conflicts**

Analysis of conflicts from the 1970s until 2003 leads the Russian military-political establishment to the following conclusions in the 2003 DWP:

- A significant part of all the conflicts has an asymmetrical nature. They demonstrate fierce fighting and in a number of cases result in total destruction of a state system;
- The outcome of conflicts is more and more determined in its initial phase. The party which takes the initiative has the advantage;
- Not only military forces but also political and military command and control systems, (economic) infrastructure as well as the population have become primary targets;
- Information and electronic warfare nowadays have a great impact in conflicts;
- The use of airborne, air mobile and special forces has increased.
- Unified command and control, joint warfare and a thorough cooperation between ground and air forces in particular has become essential;
- A prominent role in modern warfare, as demonstrated in conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), is taken by long-range precision guided munitions (PGMs) in combination with airpower, after air superiority has been established;
- Massive use of tanks and infantry has to a large extent been replaced by long-range guided weapon systems and massive air raids, although the role of these conventional forces is still important after the initial stages of a conflict;
- The dominating role of airpower in modern warfare requires a well-equipped and electronic warfare resistant anti-aircraft defence system.<sup>7</sup>

### **Ambivalence Towards the West**

In dealing with the West in general and NATO especially the 2003 DWP poses a vision of two minds. On the one hand entries show concern on the enlargement of the alliance and the possible deployment of NATO forces on the territory of new NATO members. But it also mentions that the NATO-Russia partnership will be further deepened in spite of these major differences. Furthermore, it states that nuclear and large-scale wars with NATO or other US-led coalitions are no longer probable armed conflicts and that Russia expects cooperation with the USA and other industrialised countries to grow in ensuring stability. On the other hand

elsewhere in the 2003 DWP this appeasing tone is set aside and replaced by an antagonistic approach, underlining that Russia expects that the anti-Russian entries will be removed from NATO's military planning and political declarations. Even stronger, the document states that if NATO is preserved as a military alliance with an offensive doctrine, cardinal changes will be undertaken in Russia's military planning and development of the RF Armed Forces, including its nuclear strategy. At the time of publication of the 2003 DWP these entries caused considerable concern in circles within NATO. The ambivalent character of the document clearly gives evidence that it was written by multiple authors. This has to a certain extent affected Russia's cooperation with NATO, at least temporarily. Furthermore, these contrasting entries have made it more difficult to acquire a clear picture of Russia's intentions in the field of security. Hopefully, the next RF security document will be better coordinated to prevent unnecessary negative consequences.

## **Conclusions**

### *Realistic view*

Reviewing the military-strategic and operational aspects of the 2003 DWP, the first and foremost conclusion can be described in one word: realism. Standpoints stressing the importance of information and electronic warfare, unified command and control and joint warfare, which were already included in the 2000 Military Doctrine, are repeated in this document. Furthermore, the entries of the 2000 doctrine emphasizing asymmetric warfare and discussing military actions at lower levels than military strategy, are continued and even further expanded. Rightly, this document focuses on asymmetric conflicts as being at the forefront nowadays, instead of large-scale conventional wars. Clearly, analyses of recent Western-led conflicts and of their own experiences in Chechnya have convinced the RF military-political leadership to concentrate on irregular warfare. Since this perception in the 2003 DWP is more strongly expressed than in the 2000 doctrine, the assumption could be made that the conservative part of Russia's security establishment has lost influence in decision making, from which modern thinking military leaders have benefited.

### *Implementation*

Carrying out this realistic approach towards modern warfare might be a concern. The observation that modern, specifically irregular warfare can only be fought with sophisticated weapon systems, such as PGMs and avionics providing all-weather capability, and by improving the training level of personnel, requires financial means. The current Russian armed forces, massive in form and still aimed at conventional large-scale warfare, demand a lot of money for upkeep. So far military reform plans have not offered a solution for this dilemma. In October 2004 a further downsizing of the personnel strength of the Armed Forces by 100,000 men before January 2005 was announced.<sup>8</sup> Optimistically, this reduction of ten percent of the overall strength would provide financial means for upgrading the military for modern warfare. However, the benefits of this reduction might also be used for different (non-military) purposes. Unless the military-political leadership decides to radically change the structure of the armed forces towards one which is capable of conducting asymmetric warfare, the envisaged adaptation of the RF Armed Forces is expected to be hampered.

### *Moderate style*

The overall tone of the 2003 DWP is more moderate than the major security documents of 2000. The 2000 documents mentioned without any restraint the dominance of Western states led by the USA in international politics, Western institutions weakening the role of the UNSC, as well as NATO's practice of using

military force without UNSC sanction. Anti-Western tendencies are still present in the 2003 DWP. This document repeats Russia's concern about the continuous dissolution of the system of international relations and the state of grave crisis of a number of international security institutions, but – in contrast to its predecessors of 2000 – does not directly blame the West for these developments. This tendency in Russian security thinking offers some hope that the contents of future major security documents will show a sincere endeavour to improve the relationship with the West and – as the 2003 DWP states – of “dismantling the Cold War vestiges”.

## **Outlook on Russia's External Security Policy**

After the terrorist attacks of '9/11' President Putin took a pro-Western course. In the long run Putin desired to strengthen Russia's international position, not excluding military means to achieve this. However, Putin realized quite well, in contrast to many Soviet leaders, that nowadays influence on a global level is more than ever based on economic leverage. Taking this into account, his rapprochement towards the West, and especially towards Europe, did not seem strange. Closer cooperation with the EU could serve more than one objective of Russian policy. Firstly, economic cooperation with Europe would most likely bring about growth in the Russian economy, which in turn would enhance Russia's international position. Secondly, closer ties with the EU might also weaken the relationship between Europe and the USA, even more so if Russia were supporting, or participating in, the further development of an independent European security policy with its own military power, which possibly could be in contrast with American interests. From a weakening or even split in the Trans-Atlantic camp Russia naturally could benefit in the international arena, by promoting its foreign policy principle of multipolarity in international politics and Russia's status as a great power.

At the time of the start of the second Gulf War, in March 2003, Putin was well aware of this policy option of splitting the Transatlantic, Western camp. In their plea in the UNSC for military intervention against Iraq, the USA and the UK were diametrically opposed to Germany and France. Putin supported the latter in their rejection of the use of force, just like France, by threatening to use the right of veto, and, after Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched, by a strongly worded condemnation of the use of force.<sup>9</sup> Once again the RF reaction demonstrated the dualistic nature of its policy. On the one hand Putin used the division in the Western camp to strengthen Russia's status in the international community. At the same time he apparently had instructed Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov to use more measured words towards the USA, thus serving the opposite part of Russia's dualistic policy: cooperation with the West in order to improve the RF economy.<sup>10</sup> Putin's policy regarding the war against Iraq was definitely also intended for domestic consumption. His firm stand against the USA raised goodwill among the conservative representatives of the RF security elite, who had rebuked Putin for his pro-American attitude since '9/11'. Hence, in the case of the second Gulf War, by adhering to the customary dualistic approach, Putin managed to accomplish national as well as international objectives of RF foreign and security policy.

Russia's present and future foreign and security policy is laid down in the NSC, the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine. Its defence policy is further elaborated in the 2003 DWP. Major points of view of these documents were an assertive attitude towards the West, a strengthening of Russia's position within the CIS as well as on a global level, and lastly an emphasis on military means as an

instrument of security policy. The leading security documents originated in a Russian security establishment consisting of generals, politicians, diplomats and scientists. Judging from their criticism of Putin's gestures towards the West, the state of mind of this elite did not change after '9/11'. Putin's positive policy towards the West since '9/11' had only manifested itself in public statements. Thus Putin's rapprochement towards the West did not imply a structural change of Russian foreign and security policy.

RF President Putin has to balance the pressure of his security establishment with reinforcing Russia's economic capacity. Putin's policy is symbolic for the dualistic nature of RF foreign and security policy. On the one hand international (economic) cooperation is continued and internal conflicts receive a higher priority in security thinking. On the other hand Russia continues to claim a great power status in the international arena. And a large part of the RF security establishment continues to put the accent on preparation for large-scale conflicts, on sabre-rattling with nuclear arms and in its feeling of encirclement by the hostile West. RF security policy is characterised by manoeuvring between traditional Russian imperial thinking, in terms of power and influence, and in recognizing Russia's new post Cold War status, resulting in cooperation with the West. Prolongation of this dualism is likely to be the future of the Russian Federation's foreign and security policy.

## **Internal Security Policy After Nord-Ost & Beslan**

In autumn 2002 Chechen terrorists carried out a voluminous hostage taking in Moscow. This attack had - at first sight - deep consequences for the internal security thinking in the RF. After the violent ending of the hostage taking Putin gave orders to intensify the war in Chechnya, to reform military power and to make changes in current national security documents and legislation, in order to strengthen Russia's fight against terrorism. In September 2004 Russia was shocked by another large-scale hostage taking, this time in the North-Osetian city of Beslan. In the aftermath of the Beslan hostage taking again changes in security policy were announced.

### **'Nord-Ost' Hostage Taking**

In October 2002 Chechen fighters carried out a hostage taking in a theatre in Moscow, in which the musical 'Nord-Ost' was performed. Special forces (*spetsnaz*) units of the power ministries violently put an end to this act of terror. 'Nord-Ost' had brought the Chechen conflict into Russia's capital. As a result there was a broad feeling amongst Russian military-political decision makers as well as in Russian society that this terrorist attack meant a turning point in RF security policy, which was illustrated by the Russian press by describing 'Nord-Ost' as Russia's '9/11'.<sup>11</sup> On 29 October 2002, President Putin affirmed this defining moment by ordering his security ministers and chiefs to draft a revision of the NSC.

#### *Revision of the legal foundation of security policy*

Shortly after 'Nord-Ost', parliamentarians such as Aleksey Arbatov and Andrey Nikolayev, as well as academic security specialists declared in public that this hostage taking had demonstrated that the current legal system lacked a normative basis for an effective fight against acts of terror.<sup>12</sup> The existing legal system did not live up to the demands of the necessary anti-terrorist operations: for the structure of these operations provisions concerning a joint approach (MoD forces together with troops of the power ministries) were missing, and for the actual conduct of

operations legal grounds for the use of *spetsnaz* units were needed. For that reason current legislation, such as the Constitution, the NSC, the Military Doctrine, Laws on Anti-Terrorism, Defence as well as on State of Emergency, was to be revised. In addition to this, new legislation was to be passed on the joint use of forces, troops and security organs in internal conflicts, on the deployment of RF Armed Forces, an Anti-Terror Concept and a Law on fighting terrorism. The plea for adaptation of current legislation and the introduction of dedicated additional legislation concerning operations against terrorism, not only touched upon laws and security documents, but included operational directives for forces and troops, which to a large extent were still directed at large-scale warfare.<sup>13</sup> Apart from legislation, another essential aspect of an effective fight against terrorism came to the fore: command and control of anti-terror operations. Politicians and scientists demanded a single security organ in command of anti-terror policy, which as principal and coordinating security institution would lead all security organs involved. Arbatov, Nikolayev and other security experts also pleaded to make one person responsible for anti-terror operations.<sup>14</sup>

On 29 October 2002 President Putin instructed his security ministers and chiefs to draft a revision of the NSC. According to MoD Minister Ivanov the adjustments of current legislation would include the following provisions: intensifying the involvement of the RF Armed Forces in fighting terrorism, assessing the increased threats against national security and the readiness of the RF to act against terrorists but also against their sponsors abroad. After revising the NSC, the Military Doctrine was to be altered, followed by other security documents subordinated to the NSC.<sup>15</sup>

#### *Evaluation of the policy decisions after 'Nord-Ost'*

The anticipated revision of security policy was ambivalent. On the one hand, recognizing the increased importance of internal threats and conflicts seemed to be a realistic approach by Putin. This replaced the focus on large-scale warfare, which conservative circles in the General Staff, by emphasizing nuclear instead of conventional forces, still considered to be the primary conflict. If the repeated conflicts in Chechnya and Dagestan did not make this clear, then surely 'Nord-Ost' proved that the primary threats to Russia's national security were of an internal nature. Therefore it would make sense that the revised Military Doctrine as well as other security documents took account of the increased importance of non-nuclear military means, which would correspond with the current threat perception.

Another positive effect was the conviction that the power struggle among security departments definitely should make place for overall command and control by one security organ. The conflicts in and around Chechnya perfectly made clear, that in particular shortcomings in command and control had resulted in the failures of the military. The latest edition of the Military Doctrine (2000), as well as the way warfare was conducted in the second Chechen conflict, emphasizing joint performance of operations by forces and troops, showed that the military leadership had learned from its failures in the past. The fact that this policy was now extended to anti-terror operations in Russia as a whole was justified and logical. On the subject of appointing a principal and coordinating security institution in charge of anti-terror action, and taking into account Putin's demand for centralised control of security policy, Russia's Security Council (SCRF), consisting of the President and the chiefs of all security departments and services, was likely to be selected for this capacity.

On the other hand, the ambivalence came to the fore with regard to the trend of the proposed revision in security policy, stressing military solutions and not social-economic ones. The large number of policy concepts and laws which were to be drafted in the aftermath of 'Nord-Ost', unmistakably highlighted stress on military and political solutions to the problem of terrorism. Another feature of ambivalence was the fact that Russian authorities repeatedly made it clear that the RF granted itself the right to attack terrorists abroad. This option to use force abroad was not to be conducted by an invasion of troops, but by employing PGMs in operations against terrorist training camps or against other targets out of the country, which were related to international terrorism.<sup>16</sup> By doing so, the RF permitted itself to violate norms of international law, such as the prohibition of using force and the non-intervention principle, as laid down in the UN Charter. These were not new concepts. These entries were already included in the existing security documents but were now to be stepped up. The emphasis in security policy remained on military instead of social-economic solutions, although a switch from external to internal threats was rightly included. This gave the impression that current policy principles were continued. Consequently, 'Nord-Ost' did not result in a watershed for Russian security policy.

### **'Beslan' Hostage Taking**

In September 2004 Chechen terrorists captured more than 1,000 teachers, parents and children at a school in Beslan in the North Caucasus, during the festivities at the opening of the new educational year. On the morning of 3 September armed Osetian civilians allegedly opened fire at the terrorists which set off fighting between hostage takers and RF anti-terror units, who were unprepared for storming the building at that moment. As a result of the fighting 300 to 400 hostages and servicemen were killed. Just as in 'Nord-Ost', the Federal Security Service (FSB) anti-terror units *Vypel* and *Alfa* took the lead in bringing the hostage taking to an end.<sup>17</sup> 'Beslan' was not the only terror attack in this period; the week before suicide bomb attacks at a Moscow metro station and on board of two Russian airliners killed some 100 people.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Assessment of Russia's anti-terror policy*

To a large extent the policy responses after Beslan were similar to those taken in the aftermath of 'Nord-Ost'. In their statements the political and military leadership of the MoD repeated their views of 2002, maintaining that war had been declared against Russia and that, if necessary, (preventive) attacks by Russian forces against terrorists abroad would be carried out. Likewise, politicians such as State Duma Speaker and former Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Gryzlov stated that new legislative initiatives against terror attacks would be presented to the Duma in short order.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, President Putin ordered the creation in the Southern Federal District – including Chechnya - of operative groups to coordinate the anti-terrorism activities of all security agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, the MoD and the Emergency Situations Ministry. Thus, Putin endeavoured to establish a single command of joint operations against terrorists.<sup>20</sup>

A new and unusual step taken was that the RF asked for an extraordinary session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a request which was not made for previous terror attacks, such as 'Nord-Ost'.<sup>21</sup> At the special session of the UNSC Russia asked for and received an unqualified condemnation of the hostage taking. This UNSC resolution provided Russia with the acknowledgement that the Chechen conflict was part of international terrorism, which would legitimize its actions in Chechnya. However, this international recognition did not mean that Russia allowed the international community to interfere in its internal conflict in

Chechnya. Viewed from a point of view of international law, Russia is entitled to deny Chechnya independence. At the break-up of the Soviet Union it was formally agreed that only the Soviet republics would gain independence, whereas lower administrative entities, such as autonomous republics within a Soviet republic, would remain part of that sovereign republic. Moreover, during Chechnya's de facto independence from 1996-1999, the anarchy and reign of warlords and bandits did not convince the outside world that Chechnya was able to rule itself in a proper way. Conversely, while maintaining its legal control over Chechnya, Russia could allow foreign institutions, NGOs and international organizations, such as OSCE and EU, to enter this region with relief and social-economic activities. Furthermore, the RF could grant Chechnya more autonomy and a leadership which is not closely related to the Kremlin as it is now. This would improve the circumstances of the population, weaken the position of terrorist groups and reduce the violence, in neighbouring areas such as North Osetia and Dagestan as well. However, a large part of the military and political elite in Russia will consider foreign 'interference' and a political settlement as signs of weakness. It is therefore not likely that the RF will change its present policy towards Chechnya. Equally, terror attacks by Chechen separatists are likely to continue.

## **Outlook on Russia's Internal Security Policy**

In 2002 President Putin took a large number of measures in order to adapt legislation and to reform the troops of the MoD and of the other ministries with armed formations to handle the threat of terrorism. Beslan has shown that new laws and military reforms are insufficient. Legal and military measures are not enough. At the bottom of the threat of terrorism are social and economic roots: unemployment, poverty, lack of education, housing and medical care. Putin has announced that he will also take measures in the social-economic field. However, Russian governments have made similar statements after the first (1994-1996) and second Chechen wars. It will be for the benefit of the population of Russia as a whole when this time these promises will be fulfilled.

## **Putin's Comprehensive Security Policy: The Revised National Security Concept**

On 29 October 2002 President Putin instructed his security ministers and chiefs to draft a revision of the NSC. After Beslan a revision of the NSC again came to the fore as one of the policy measures. On 29 September 2004 Igor Ivanov, Secretary of the SCRF, announced that Russia would review its NSC in the light of the war against international terrorism. Ivanov noted that the present concept was adopted in 2000, before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and therefore it did not reflect the new reality.<sup>22</sup> Surprisingly, no mentioning was made that already in October 2002 Putin had ordered such a revision of the NSC. Apparently, until Beslan the anticipated revision had not left the stage of rhetoric. Very recently, more details of the contents of a new NSC have been released. On 1 February 2005, at a scientific conference on the NSC, Igor Ivanov explained the current phase of development of the highest security document. He made clear that key issues in the new NSC will be social-economic problems, the fight against terrorism, disparities in development among Russia's regions, insufficient funding for science and technology, environmental and demographic problems, as well as public confidence in government bodies and state institutions.<sup>23</sup>

However, most of these entries were also listed in previous editions of the NSC, such as the current one of 2000. Furthermore, the assessment that internal social-economic problems are the most complicated and urgent trial for Russia has also been stated before but without any doubt demonstrates a realistic view of Russia's present situation. The bottom line, as discussed more than once in this article, is whether the observation of the prominence of internal problems will result in decision making in that direction. Until now Russia's conservative security establishment has always been able to bypass a social-economic approach and solution by putting a military approach to external as well as internal security on the agenda. Let us see if this time other actors will be strong enough in order that the new NSC and the resulting policy measures will provide a genuine answer to the challenges of Russia.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> See Table 1: 'Main entries of the 2000 security documents and the 2003 Defence White Paper' for an overview of the main entries of the four security documents.

<sup>2</sup> The paragraph on the 2000 editions of the major RF security documents is to a large extent derived from M de Haas, *Russian Security and Air Power (1992-2002): The development of Russian security thinking under Yeltsin and Putin and its consequences for the air forces* (London, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, ISBN 0-714-65608-9, August 2004), pp74-97. The part on the 'Nord-Ost' hostage taking is derived from pp198-204 of the same work.

See the following sources for the contents of the 2000 editions of the three principal security documents:

**National Security Concept (January 2000):** Russian: 'Kontseptsiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 1 (14 January 2000), p1, [www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24-1.html](http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24-1.html), English: [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm).

**Military Doctrine (April 2000):** Russian: 'Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 15 (28 April 2000), [www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/706-1.html](http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/706-1.html), English: [www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm](http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm).

**Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000):** Russian: 'Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 25 (14 July 2000), p4, [www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/07-10.html](http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/07-10.html), English: [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm).

<sup>3</sup> M A Smith, *Putin's Regime: Administered Democracy*, E108 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2000).

<sup>4</sup> 'Putin announces broad reorganization of political system in Russia', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines*, Vol 8, No 174, Part I, 13 September 2004. See also Dr Mark A Smith, *Beslan – The Political Fallout*, 04/28, Russian Series, Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 2004, <http://www.da.mod/csdc>.

<sup>5</sup> As explained to the author by Irina Kirilova, lecturer in Russian studies, University of Cambridge, at a Wilton Park Conference, March 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Defence White Paper of 2003: *Aktual'nyye zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhënnnykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii* (The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), RF MoD, 2 October 2003. [www.rian.ru/rian/intro.cfm?doc\\_id=261](http://www.rian.ru/rian/intro.cfm?doc_id=261); [http://supol.narod.ru/archive/official\\_documents/doctrine/war\\_doctrine.htm](http://supol.narod.ru/archive/official_documents/doctrine/war_doctrine.htm).

<sup>7</sup> DWP, 2003, pp34-38. For a broader assessment of the military-strategic and operational aspects of the 2003 DWP see: M de Haas, 'The contours of new Russian airpower thinking', *NATO School Polaris Quarterly*, Volume 1, Issue 1, spring 2004, pp21-29.

<sup>8</sup> V Solov'yev, 'Russia's military faces 10% downsizing', *Moscow News*, 20-26 October 2004; A Babakin & V Myasnikov, 'Aviatsiya i podvodnyy flot nuzhny men'she vsego', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 39 (399), 15 October 2004, pp1, 3.

<sup>9</sup> 'Putin says Iraq crisis most serious conflict since end of cold war', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security Watch*, Vol 4, No 13, 1 April 2003.



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- <sup>10</sup> 'Foreign minister concerned by US efforts to seize Iraqi assets', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security Watch*, Vol 4, No 12, 26 March 2003; 'Putin stresses need to avoid conflict with US', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security Watch*, Vol 4, No 14, 9 April 2003.
- <sup>11</sup> V Solovyev, 'I vsë-taki my pobedim', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 39 (309), 1 November 2002, p1.
- <sup>12</sup> S Sokolov, 'Poslesloviye k "Nord-Ostu"', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 39 (309), 1 November 2002, p8, and 'Neobkhodima reorganizatsiya spetssluzhb Rossii', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 40 (310), 15 November 2002, p1; S Bogdanov, 'Voyna vne zakona', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 38 (308), 25 October 2002, p4; 'Orders revision of national security concept', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security and Terrorism Watch*, (Vol 3), (No 39) 5 November 2002; A I Nikolayev, 'U nas – terroristicheskaya voyna', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 40 (310), 26 November 2002, p1.
- <sup>13</sup> Bogdanov, 'Voyna vne zakona'.
- <sup>14</sup> Sokolov, 'Poslesloviye k "Nord-Ostu"', and 'Neobkhodima reorganizatsiya spetssluzhb Rossii'; Nikolayev, 'U nas – terroristicheskaya voyna'.
- <sup>15</sup> V Solovyev, 'Zvezdoy po terrorismu', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, No 42 (312), 29 November 2002, p1.
- <sup>16</sup> 'Defence minister says Russia is at war', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Security Watch*, (Vol 3), (No 40), 12 November 2002.
- <sup>17</sup> 'Russian elite antiterror units suffer worst casualties in its history', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines*, (Vol 8), (No 170) 7 September 2004.
- <sup>18</sup> 'War on terror: Russia girds itself for war', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Political Weekly*, (Vol 4), (No 34) 2 September 2004.
- <sup>19</sup> 'War on terror: Russia girds itself for war'.
- <sup>20</sup> 'Putin creates system for emergency military administration in Southern Russia', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines*, (Vol 8), (No 173), 10 September 2004.
- <sup>21</sup> 'War on terror: Russia girds itself for war'.
- <sup>22</sup> 'Russia to review its National Security Concept', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines*, (Vol 8), (No 187) 1 October 2004.
- <sup>23</sup> 'National security strategy is being aligned with practice', *Izvestia*, 3 February 2005.

**Table 1: Main Entries of the 2000 Security Documents & the 2003 Defence White Paper<sup>1</sup>**

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>1. RUSSIA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY</b>				
<b><i>Destabilizing factors for the military-political situation</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Dominance in the international community of developed western states led by the United States.</b> This is especially aimed at applying unilateral solutions, including the use of military force, to key problems in world politics, flouting the fundamental principles of international law</li> <li>• Efforts to weaken Russia's position politically, economically and militarily, as well as in other fields</li> <li>• Attempts to ignore the interests of Russia in solving major problems in international relations</li> <li>• Terrorism poses a threat to world stability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist and terrorist movements, organisations and structures</li> <li>• Attempts to weaken (ignore) existing mechanism for ensuring international security, above all the UN and OSCE</li> <li>• Applying military force <b>as a means of "humanitarian intervention"</b> without UN Security Council sanction, in circumvention of international law</li> <li>• <b>Expansion of the scale of organised crime, terrorism and illegal trade of arms and narcotics</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Unilateral actions</b> can destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate contradictions, national and religious strife</li> <li>• <b>The use of force in violation of the UN Charter is unlawful</b> and poses a threat to the stability of the entire system of international relations</li> <li>• Attempts to introduce into international parlance such <b>concepts as "humanitarian intervention" and "limited sovereignty"</b> in order to justify unilateral power actions <b>bypassing the UNSC are not acceptable</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The current stage of global development is noted for acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions</li> <li>• Security is shifting from questions of war and peace to complicated political, financial-economic, ethnic-national, demographic and other problems</li> <li>• <b>The significance of military power in the post-bipolar world has not diminished, since a number of international security institutions are in grave crisis</b></li> </ul>
<b>2. RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS</b>				
<b><i>Social-economic</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Realising Russia's national interests is possible only on the basis of stable economic development.</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To create favourable external conditions for steady development of Russia</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
	<p>That is why the national interests of Russia in this field are the crucial ones</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The national interests of Russia in the social field lie in guaranteeing the population a high standard of living</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improving Russia's economy</li> <li>Enhancing the standards of living of the population</li> </ul>	
<b>Domestic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Upholding the stability of the constitutional system</li> <li>Eliminating the causes and conditions contributing to political and religious extremism, ethno-separatism, and their consequences, ie social, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts and terrorism</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To ensure reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity,</li> <li>Strengthening the basis of the constitutional system</li> <li>Successfully carrying out democratic reforms</li> <li>Observing individual rights and freedoms</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>
<b>International</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Strengthening Russia's position as a great power</b>, as one of the centres of influence in a multipolar world</li> <li>Developing mutually advantageous relations, <b>especially with the member states of the CIS</b> and Russia's traditional partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RF attaches priority importance to the development of <b>military cooperation with parties to the CIS Collective Security Treaty</b>, because of the necessity to consolidate forces towards the <b>creation of a unified defence space</b> and ensure collective military security</li> <li>The RF executes a <b>common defence policy with Belarus</b> in the field of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with <b>the interests of the RF as a great power, as one of the most influential centres of the modern world</b></li> <li>Russia shall seek to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations</li> <li>A <b>priority</b> area in Russia's</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening of the RF armed <b>forces may prevent the final dissolution of the system of international relations</b>, based upon international law</li> <li>The RF armed forces can <b>ensure global stability</b></li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
		military organisation and the development of the Armed Forces of the member states of the Union	foreign policy is multilateral and bilateral <b>cooperation with the member states of the CIS</b> • <b>Relations with European states</b> is Russia's <b>traditional foreign policy priority</b> • Of <b>key importance</b> are relations with the <b>European Union (EU)</b> • The <b>intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on its compliance</b> with key clauses of the NATO-RF Founding Act of 1997	
<b>Military</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defending its independence, its sovereignty and its state and territorial integrity</li> <li>Preventing military aggression against Russia and its allies</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To ensure reliable security of the country</li> <li>We attach a <b>priority importance</b> to joint efforts toward <b>settling conflicts in CIS</b> member states</li> <li>And, through the <b>CIS Collective Security Treaty</b>, to the development of <b>cooperation in the military-political area</b> and in the sphere of security, particularly in combating international terrorism and extremism</li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
<b>3. THREATS TO RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<i>Internal threats</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethno-egoism, ethno-centrism and chauvinism are helping to reinforce nationalism, political and <b>religious extremism and ethno-separatism</b></li> <li>• The legal <b>unity of the country is being eroded by separatist aspirations of a number of constituent entities</b> of the RF, and by poor organisation of state control<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• <b>Linking of some parts of the executive and the legislature to criminal organisations</b></li> <li>• Deep division of society into a rich few and an overwhelming underprivileged majority</li> <li>• The threat to the physical health of the nation as seen in the rise in alcohol consumption and drug use and in the dramatic reduction in the country's birthrate and in average life expectancy</li> <li>• <b>The under-funding of national defence leads to</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The unlawful activities of extremist national-ethnic, religious and separatist and terrorist movements, organisations and structures</li> <li>• Attempts to <b>disrupt the unity and territorial integrity of the state</b> and to destabilize the internal situation</li> <li>• Attempts to overthrow the constitutional system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The growth of separatism, ethnic-national and religious extremism</li> <li>• The growth of international terrorism, transnational organized crime, as well as <b>illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of force against Russia's constitutional regime</li> <li>• Actions to disrupt and disorganise bodies of state power</li> <li>• International terrorism</li> <li>• Ethnic instability</li> <li>• Actions of subversive separatist, national or religious groups</li> <li>• Drug trafficking</li> <li>• Organized and transborder crime</li> <li>• <b>Illegal armed formations to be dispatched to Russia or its allies</b></li> <li>• <b>Information (psychological) actions hostile to Russia and allies</b></li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
	<p><b>a critically low level of operational and combat training</b> in the armed forces and other troops</p>			
<b>External threats</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attempts by separate states and intergovernmental organisations to <b>belittle the role of existing mechanisms for the maintenance of international security, primarily the UN</b> and the OSCE</li> <li>• The danger that the political, economic and military influence of Russia in the world will be reduced</li> <li>• The strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all the <b>expansion of NATO eastwards</b></li> <li>• The possible presence of <b>foreign military bases and large military contingents in the immediate vicinity of Russian borders</b></li> <li>• The weakening of the processes of integration in the CIS</li> <li>• The development and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interference in RF internal affairs</li> <li>• Attempts to ignore (or infringe on) RF interests in resolving international security problems</li> <li>• Attempts to oppose the increase of influence of the RF on a global level</li> <li>• The expansion of military blocs and alliances</li> <li>• The introduction of foreign troops (without UNSC sanction) to the territory of contiguous states friendly with the RF</li> <li>• <b>Suppression of the rights of RF citizens abroad (inostrannykh)</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Growing trend towards a unipolar structure of the world with the <b>economic and power domination of the United States</b></li> <li>• <b>Stakes are being placed on Western institutions</b> and forums of limited composition, and on <b>weakening the role of the UNSC</b></li> <li>• <b>Attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state</b> as the fundamental element of international relations generate a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs</li> <li>• <b>NATO's</b> present-day political and military guidelines <b>do not coincide with RF security interests</b> and occasionally directly contradict them</li> <li>• <b>This primarily concerns the provisions of NATO's new strategic concept</b>, which do not exclude the use of force outside NATO's Treaty zone <b>without the</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Deployment of foreign troops in the territory of new NATO members</b> and countries that aspire to join the bloc</li> <li>• Unilateral use of military power without UNSC mandate <b>encourages greater demand for weapons of mass destruction</b></li> <li>• <b>Armed force used by ad hoc coalitions</b></li> <li>• <b>Cold war stereotypes continue to exist, aggravating the international situation</b></li> <li>• Proliferation of mass destruction weapons</li> <li>• <b>Armed force is increasingly used for protecting economic interests</b>, which enlarges foreign policy requirements for using violence</li> <li>• Reducing the role of the UNSC is seen as a dangerous tendency</li> <li>• <b>Renationalization of security policy of states</b></li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
	<p>escalation of conflicts close to the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of the member states of the CIS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International terrorism has unleashed an open campaign to destabilise the situation in Russia</li> <li>• <b>NATO's practice of using military force</b> outside the bloc's zone of responsibility <b>without UNSC sanction, now elevated to the rank of a strategic doctrine</b>, threatens to destabilise the entire global strategic situation</li> </ul>		<p><b>sanction of the UNSC</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia retains its <b>negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO</b></li> <li>• <b>The protracted conflict in Afghanistan creates a real threat to security of the southern CIS borders and directly affects Russian interests</b></li> </ul>	<p><b>in Central Asia, the Far East or elsewhere in the CIS</b> will compel Russia to consider the region as a potential source of ethnic conflicts, border disputes and military-political instability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interference in internal RF affairs</li> <li>• Demonstration of military power close to the borders of Russia</li> <li>• Expansion of military blocs</li> <li>• <b>Strengthening of Islamic extremism close to RF borders</b></li> <li>• Infringement on the rights and interests of Russian citizens in foreign states (<i>za rubezhem</i>)</li> </ul>
<b>4. ENSURING RUSSIA'S SECURITY</b>				
<b>Fundamentals and objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timely prediction, detection and neutralisation of external and internal threats</li> <li>• Guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity</li> <li>• <b>Overcoming</b> the Russian Federation's scientific, technical and <b>technological dependence on external sources</b></li> </ul>	The RF adheres to the fundamental principles and rules of international law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <b>United Nations</b> must remain the <b>main centre for regulating international relations</b></li> <li>• The RF shall resolutely <b>oppose attempts to belittle the role of UN</b> and its Security Council in world affairs</li> <li>• <b>Preservation of the status of the permanent</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nuclear and large-scale <b>wars with NATO or other US-led coalitions are no longer probable</b> armed conflicts</li> <li>• Russia expects cooperation with the USA and other industrialised countries to grow in ensuring stability and dismantling the Cold War vestiges</li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Improving the system of state power</b> of the RF, its federal relations, its local self-government, tightening up law and order and reinforcing the social and political stability of society</li> <li>• <b>Guaranteeing strict observance of the laws</b> by all citizens, public servants, state institutions, political parties and social and religious organisations</li> <li>• <b>Raising the military potential of the state</b> and maintaining it at a sufficiently high level</li> <li>• Organising a <b>common economic area with the member states of the CIS</b></li> </ul>		<p><b>members of the UNSC</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Only the UNSC</b> has the authority to <b>sanction use of force</b> for the purpose of achieving peace</li> <li>• Other use of force is unlawful and poses a threat to the stability of the entire system of international relations</li> <li>• <b>To protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad (<i>za rubezhëm</i>)</b> on the basis of international law and operative bilateral agreements</li> <li>• The RF will seek to obtain adequate guarantees for the rights and freedoms of compatriots in states where they permanently reside and to maintain and <b>develop comprehensive ties with them and their organizations</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic relations with EU-countries will further develop</li> </ul>
<b>Foreign policy objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reinforcing vital machinery for multilateral management of world political and economic processes, above all under jurisdiction of the UNSC</li> <li>• <b>Defending the legal rights and interests of Russian</b></li> </ul>	<i>Not mentioned</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To promote <b>elimination</b> of the existing and prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of tension and <b>conflicts in regions adjacent to the RF</b></li> <li>• Russia regards as its <b>most important foreign policy</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>NATO-Russia Partnership is maintained despite major differences</b> on issues of enlargement of the alliance and its foreign military operations</li> <li>• The main international obligations of Russia are</li> </ul>



Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
	<p><b>citizens resident abroad (za rubezhëm)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing relations with the members of the CIS, and <b>developing integration processes within the CIS in Russia's interests</b></li> <li>Adapting existing arms control and arms reduction agreements to new conditions in international relations and, if necessary, concluding new agreements, primarily concerning confidence and security building measures</li> </ul>		<p><b>task to combat international terrorism</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia shall collaborate with other states purposefully to combat illegal drug trafficking and the growth of organized crime</li> <li><b>Partnership with all CIS member states</b> to take into account in a due manner the interests of the RF, including <b>guaranteeing rights of Russian compatriots (za rubezhëm)</b></li> <li><b>Respect by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia</b> of Russian interests, including in the key question of respect <b>for the rights of the Russian-speaking population (za rubezhëm)</b></li> </ul>	<p>related to the UN, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation of the CIS, the <b>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</b> and Belarus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Russia expects that the anti-Russian entries will be removed from military planning and political declarations of NATO members</b></li> </ul>
<b>Ensuring military security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the prevention of war and armed conflicts, the RF gives preference to political, diplomatic, economic and other non-military action</li> <li><b>All forces and facilities available, including nuclear weapons, will be used</b> if necessary to repel</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensuring military security</li> <li>Suppression of aggression towards the RF <b>and (or) its allies</b></li> <li>The RF retains nuclear power status for deterring aggression against the RF <b>and (or) its allies</b></li> <li>The RF retains the right to use nuclear weapons in</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia is prepared to consent to a <b>further reduction of its nuclear potential</b> on the basis of bilateral agreements with the USA</li> <li>Russia shall seek preservation and <b>observance of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>If NATO is preserved as a military alliance with an offensive doctrine, cardinal changes will be undertaken in Russia's military planning and development of the RF Armed Forces, including its nuclear strategy</b></li> <li>RF Armed Forces will</li> </ul>

Themes	National Security Concept January 2000	Military Doctrine April 2000	Foreign Policy Concept June 2000	Defence White Paper October 2003
	<p>armed aggression, if all other means have been exhausted</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Keep up a deterrence capability in the interest of preventing aggression on whatever scale, including when nuclear arms are used against Russia and its allies</li> <li>• <b>The RF must have nuclear forces</b> for use against any aggressor state or coalition of states</li> <li>• One of the most important strategic <b>objectives of military security is the interaction and co-operation with the member states of the CIS</b></li> </ul>	<p>response to weapons of mass destruction and in response to wide-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical <b>for the RF</b></p>	<p><b>of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM)</b> - the cornerstone of strategic stability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The implementation of the <b>plans of USA to create a national missile defense system</b> will inevitably <b>compel the RF to adopt adequate measures</b> for maintaining its national security at a proper level</li> <li>• Russia intends to further promote the strengthening of regional stability by participating in the processes of reducing and <b>limiting conventional armed forces</b></li> <li>• Averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction</li> </ul>	<p>contain military and military-political threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RF Armed Forces will ensure Russia's economic and political interests and its territorial integrity</li> <li>• <b>Ensuring the security of Russian citizens in armed conflicts and situations of instability</b></li> <li>• Fight against international terrorism, political extremism and separatism</li> <li>• Preservation of a <b>strategic deterrence force potential aimed at preventing power politics</b> or aggression against Russia and allies</li> </ul>
<b>Deployment of Armed Forces and Other Troops abroad</b>	<p><b>The interests of Russia's national security may require a Russian military presence in certain strategically vital regions of the world.</b> The stationing of limited military contingents (military bases, navy units) in these regions should <b>ensure that Russia is ready to help establish a stable military-</b></p>	<p>Limited contingents of <b>RF armed forces and other troops may be deployed in regions of strategic importance, outside RF territory</b>, as combined or national task forces and bases</p>	<p><i>Not mentioned</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The strong Russian armed <b>forces have a geopolitical significance</b></li> <li>• The RF armed forces can, by decision of the president, <b>conduct operations in regions of vital economic and political interest of Russia</b></li> </ul>

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	<b>strategic balance</b> of forces in the regions, should give the RF an opportunity to <b>respond to a crisis situation</b> in its initial stage, and should <b>enable the state to meet its foreign policy goals</b>			

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<sup>1</sup> The citations are mostly not literally derived from the different security documents, but are adapted by the author. Remarkable differences between the documents or vital entries are printed in bold type. The grouping of related entries as used here is for the purpose of clarity and does not necessarily correspond with the original documents.

<sup>2</sup> Constituent entities or subjects are administrative authorities within the Russian Federation, below the federal, national level, with specific self-governing legislative, executive and judicial powers.

An earlier version of this article, entitled "Putin's security policy in past, present and future: An analysis of the security documents of 2000 compared with the Defence White Paper of 2003", appeared in *Baltic Defence Review*, Vol 2/2004, No 12, pp39-59.

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See: "*The contours of new Russian airpower thinking*", NATO School Polaris Quarterly, Vol 1, Issue 1, spring 2004, pp21-29, [http://www.natoschool.nato.int/site\\_polaris/Polaris\\_Quarterly\\_Vol01\\_Issue1.pdf](http://www.natoschool.nato.int/site_polaris/Polaris_Quarterly_Vol01_Issue1.pdf)

*Russian Security and Air Power (1992-2002): The development of Russian security thinking under Yeltsin and Putin and its consequences for the air forces*, London, New York: Frank Cass Publishers, ISBN 0-714-65608-9, (August 2004)

"*The terror attack at Beslan: 'Nord-Ost' revisited?*", Monthly Strategic Report, Işık University, Turkey, Vol 1, Issue 2, October 2004, pp1-7, [http://www.isikun.edu.tr/IIBF/eng/international\\_relations/MSR/Volume%202.pdf](http://www.isikun.edu.tr/IIBF/eng/international_relations/MSR/Volume%202.pdf)

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