

Conflict Studies Research Centre



"Whither Ingushetia?"

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January 2006

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Key Points

- * For both Ingush and Chechen the mass deportations of 1944 remain a relevant and painful factor.
- * North Osetian reaction to the Beslan tragedy has prevented the return to Prigorodnyy rayon of 10,500 Ingush expelled in 1992.
- * Certain provisions of Federal Law No. 131 have become a catalyst for Ingush opposition.
- * As the second most subsidised region in the RF, Ingushetia is likely to have direct budgetary control on expenditure imposed by the centre.
- * 50% of regional boundaries in the North Caucasus lack legal documentation.

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“WHITHER INGUSHETIA?”

C W BLANDY

Introduction

*Squeezed between mountains and steppe, between two military conflicts, between Caucasian customs and Moscow’s money, between a capitalist and socialist structure, the small republic is not only concerned about itself. It understands that it can serve as a small step on the way to a large Caucasus conflict, towards a huge Russian calamity.*¹

The short extract above provides a succinct summary of the external pressures facing the youngest republic in the Russian Federation, which was formed on 4 June 1992.² It also serves as a reminder of Ingush vulnerability to the dictates of the centre, including the perennial dispute between Ingush and Osetian over Prigorodnyy rayon, the roots of which stretch back to the mass deportations of 1944.

Historically, the Ingush people, a numerically small, but nonetheless important branch of the Vaynakh family, have tended to be the ‘injured’ party, susceptible to the flow of events from outside Ingush-populated lands. The Ingush have tended to be overshadowed by their Chechen cousins. The Ingush, whilst supportive of the Chechens on many occasions, have tended to avoid armed confrontation and to use the voice of moderation: *“Chechens are restless, bellicose, the Ingush on the other hand are peace loving peasants. ‘Yes, according to language we are related, our religion is one thing, but others say our mentality is much closer to the Osetian.”*³

The fact that the Ingush were included in the same administrative-territorial entity with North Osetians between 1840 and 1934 probably accounted for this. The passage of time has emphasised the vulnerability of the Ingush due to their small population and lack of land. Is the existence of Ingushetia as a separate entity still assured? The recent Kozak report mooted the concept of amalgamating some other subjects in the north Caucasus, as has already happened elsewhere in Russia.⁴

Back to the Present

In the 19th Century the Ingush population was dwarfed by the Chechen population and to a lesser degree by that of the North Osetians to the west. According to research by V. M. Kabuzan on ‘Terek oblast’ in the 1830s, Chechens numbered 190,000, Ingush 28,000 and Osetians 35,000.⁵ Table 1 below traces population trends from 1867 to 1989 in the territory covered by the former Terek oblast’ and from 1939 by the Autonomous Republics of North Osetia and Checheno-Ingushetia.

Table 1 – Ethnic Populations - 1867 to 1989⁶

Ethnicity	1867	1897	1917	1939	1959	1989
Total Terek Oblast⁷	567,100	933,900	1,426,700	1,484,700	1,581,100	2,656,600
Russian	217,500	271,100	585,900	536,400	689,600	723,800
Ukrainian	45,000	41,400	50,000	30,700	31,500	35,500
German	2,300	9,500	16,900	10,100		8,600
Armenian	14,100	9,100	27,800	14,500	25,200	28,400
Kabardin	46,400	83,800	102,900	154,400	132,300	363,500
Nogay	11,600	35,700	33,700			6,900
Chechen	143,200	223,200	253,100	369,100	244,900	734,500
Osetian	52,000	96,500	144,500	174,700	225,000	344,900
Avar	6,200	15,100				6,300
Kumyk	20,600	31,300	34,600	10,100	20,900	19,400
Ingush	24,400	46,200	57,500	89,900	54,400	196,600
Balkar	11,000	23,200	33,000	39,000	34,100	70,800
North Osetia				407,900	450,600	632,400
Osetians				168,400	215,500	334,900
Russians				156,100	178,700	189,200
Armenians				10,900	12,000	13,600
Ukrainians				9,600	9,400	10,100
Georgians				6,900	8,200	12,300
Ingush				33,400	6,100	32,800
Kumyks				1,500	3,900	9,500
Jews				2,100	2,100	
Kabardins				4,100	2,000	
Checheno-Ingushetia				727,100	710,400	1,270,400
Chechens				368,100	244,000	734,500
Ingush				56,500	48,300	163,800
Russians				253,200	348,300	293,800
Dagestanis				8,600	17,000	13,200
Ukrainians				10,100	13,700	12,600
Armenians				3,600	13,200	14,800
Osetians				2,000	3,100	
Avars						6,300

One cannot but be struck by the dramatic fluctuation of the Ingush population from 33,400 in 1939 to 6,100 in 1959 as a result of their inability to reclaim their properties in North Osetia. Following mass deportation the Ingush return from

enforced exile was spread over a long period. Table 2 below shows the Ingush percentage share of the population in North Osetia in 1959 by rayon.

Table 2 – Ethnic Peoples of North Osetia by Rayon from 1959 Population Census⁷

Rayon	Russian %	Osetian %	Ukrainian %	Georgian %	Ingush %
Ordzhonikidze (town)	57.1	23.2	3.0	4.8	1.5
Alagirskiy	17.2	78.8	1.1	0.3	
Ardonskiy	22.4	75.2	0.5	0.5	
Digorskiy	14.9	83.7	0.5		
Irakskiy	4.2	93.7	0.4		
Kirovskiy	19.9	75.8	1.0	0.3	
Mozdokskiy	67.5	9.0	3.9	0.4	0.6
Ordzhonikidze (rural)	23.1	75.2	0.7	0.7	
Pravoberezhnyy	3.7	58.7	2.1	0.3	
Prigorodnyy	19.2	63.4	0.9	1.5	12.6

Notes

1. Ordzhonokidze now Vladikavkaz.
2. Percentages for Armenians, Tatars, Kabardins and others not included.

The substantial rise in the North Osetian population from 168,400 (1939) to 215,500 (1959) is partially accounted for by the decision of the Committee of Peoples Commissars on 9 March 1944 to implement an *orgnabor*, an organised work employment of Osetian families from Georgia and South Osetia with the aim of resettling Prigorodnyy rayon and the population centres in Malgobekskiy, Nazranovskiy and Psedakhskiy rayony in place of the deported Ingush. The resettlement of Osetians from the south worked against the rehabilitation of the Ingush. A more recent increase in the Osetian population was the result of another wave of South Osetians from Georgia fleeing conflict between Tbilisi and the separatist South Osetian AO at the beginning of the 1990s.⁸

From a purely numerical aspect in the 19th Century it could be argued that combining the Osetians and Ingush into one single administrative entity made logical sense. However, amalgamation was due to over-riding reasons of political and military control: internal administrative divisions in Terek oblast' during Tsarist times deliberately separated the Ingush from their Chechen cousins and included them in the Osetian okrug of the Western Military Department. The significantly larger Chechen population was given its own okrug which came under the Central Military Department.⁹ However, when the separate Ingush and North Osetian oblasts were created in 1924, an autonomous Cossack community in Sunzhenskiy okrug was de facto established. However, it should not be forgotten that between May 1918 and 1922 Bol'shevik power utilised the Ingush in a general campaign of repression against Cossacks in the North Caucasus.¹⁰

Later, on 26 February 1925 the Ingush and North Osetian oblasts, Sunzhenskiy okrug and the city of Vladikavkaz were included in the North Caucasus Kray with

Vladikavkaz fulfilling the role of a capital city for both oblasts. The Chechen and Ingush oblasts were amalgamated to form an autonomous oblast' in 1934 which was later upgraded to an autonomous republic in 1936. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in 1934 when the Checheno-Ingush AO was formed, "*Vladikavkaz was transferred to be fully under the jurisdiction of North Osetia, having become its capital, the Ingush themselves lost their own republic and Vladikavkaz*".¹¹ As future events came to demonstrate all too vividly, the loss of Vladikavkaz weakened the Ingush position and their claims against Osetian sequestration of homes and property in Prigorodnyy rayon after the period of mass deportation, exile and subsequent return between 1957-1960.

As a gesture of compensation to the Ingush for their loss of Prigorodnyy rayon, the Checheno-Ingush ASSR received the mainly Cossack rayony of Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy from Stavropol' Kray. However, this transfer became a bitter pill for the Terek Cossack Host to swallow, for Naurskiy was 83.2% Russian and Shelkovskiy was 71% Russian in 1959. One of the results of these transfers was the departure of Cossacks as the land gradually came under Chechen occupation.

Table 3 – 1959 Census - Population Percentages by Rayon in Checheno-Ingush ASSR ¹²

Rayony	Chechen %	Russian %	Ingush %	Others %	Ukrainian %	Armenian %	Osetian %
Groznenskiy	11.1	74.2	0.9	13.8	3.1	4.1	0.3
Malgobekskiy	9.6	56.2	25.6	8.6	1.6		1.9
Vedenskiy	93.8	2.6		3.6			
Gudermesskiy	28.7	58.9		12.4	2.7		
Akhoy- Martanovskiy	83.2	12.1	2.2	2.5	0.6		
Kargalinskiy	3.8	72.3		23.9	1.5	0.8	
Kurchaloyevskiy	96.0	1.8		2.2			
Nadterechnyy	70.8	25.1		4.1	1.0		
Nazranovskiy	0.6	6.7	91.2	1.5	0.3		0.9
Naurskiy*	7.3	83.2*		9.5	2.9		1.4
Nagoy-Yurtovskiy	96.8	1.8		1.4			
Pervomayskiyy	1.4	17.4	72.5	8.7	1.4		
Sakhsanovskiy	97.3	1.4		1.3			
Sovetskiy	77.6	4.0		18.4			
Sunzhenskiy	6.7	78.9	4.2	10.2	2.5	2.1	0.2
Urus- Martanovskiy	87.6	9.8	0.2	2.4	0.5		
Shalinskiy	87.1	9.3		3.6	0.7	0.2	
Shelkovskiy*	5.7	71.0*		23.3	1.5		2.6
Total In All	34.3	49.0	6.8	9.9	1.9	1.9	0.4

*Returnees from Stalin-era exile

The lack of land in Ingushetia itself has led to an intensification of attachment to the land and traditional burial grounds. This has particular significance in the case of Ingush whose forefathers are buried in Prigorodnyy rayon,¹³ in present day North Osetia. There has always been a severe shortage of tillable land and pasture for cattle throughout the North Caucasus. Due to programmes of deportation and forced resettlement in the 19th century of both Ingush and Chechen, land is a resonant factor for the Ingush people.

The question of the transfer of Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy rayony is not far below the surface in conversation with Terek Cossacks. Whilst from the Chechen and Ingush point of view compensation for losing Prigorodnyy rayon was a step forward in acknowledging the wrong done to the Ingush, it should also be remembered that *“the most important political-administrative reorganisations were carried out without any agreement (referenda or even a simple question) with the inhabitants”*¹⁴ in the North Caucasus. The Cossack argument remains that the two rayony were transferred to the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, but not to the Vaynakh people. With the break-up of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR Terek Cossacks in general believe that it is wrong for Chechnya to remain in possession of the two rayony.

It is also important to remember that in a much wider sense the Checheno-Ingush ASSR itself was erased from the map in February 1944. All references to the republic were removed from libraries and other public establishments. The republic simply did not exist. The former title of republic was replaced by ‘Groznskaya oblast’, a much smaller administrative-territorial entity.


Parts of the original Checheno-Ingush Republic were hived off to the Daghestan ASSR, the Georgian SSR, and as mentioned above, Prigorodnyy rayon was passed to North Osetia together with the narrow transit corridor leading to Mozdok from Vladikavkaz, as shown in Map 1. The territory handed over to Daghestan in 1944 included the former Aukhovtsy rayon (now Novolakskiy rayon) populated by some 70,000 Chechen-Akkin,¹⁵ and acted as a magnet for Chechens minded to achieve a unification of Chechnya and Daghestan; it became a major factor in the ‘invasions’ into Novolakskiy rayon in September 1999.¹⁶ However, in 1944, Groznskaya oblast’ received territory from Stavropol’ kray, namely lands north of the River Terek.¹⁷

Ingushetia has been and remains a very small administrative-territorial entity, consisting of only 3,600 sq km. The distance from north to south is 144 km and from east to west 72 km.¹⁸ Ingushetia has always had a significantly lower level of population compared to that of Chechnya and North Osetia, amounting in 2002 to 466,300, where the Ingush made up 83% (387,029), Chechens 11.2% (52,225.6), Russians 4% (18,652) and others 0.8%. The population remains more rural than urban: 58.5% and 41.5% respectively.¹⁹

The 2002 Census²⁰ put the Chechen and North Osetian populations at: Chechens 1,360,000; rural 66% and urban 33.8% and North Osetians at 515,000 people: rural 34.5%; urban 65.5%. However, there needs to be a note of caution: how many Chechens are actually resident in Chechnya now? One should remember the Chechen referendum and presidential elections in March and October 2003 with alleged inflated lists of voters. Taking into account Chechens outside Chechnya, Chechens in Ingushetia, Chechens who have returned to Kazakhstan, others lodging in Stavropol’ Kray and elsewhere one could expect a more realistic figure to be around 600,000.²¹

Map 1- Checheno-Ingush ASSR Territorial Changes 1944²²

Chechen-Ingush Border Changes

**Ingush Vulnerability**

Ingushetia is vulnerable to external pressure and events. Grave injustices have been perpetrated against the Ingush people, who are a minuscule factor in a vast country where magnitude, might and power over centuries have always tended to be accorded respect and precedence: insignificant size and weakness are despised.

Perhaps one of the most galling aspects of the situation was that their mini-republic became a haven for Chechens fleeing the conflict in Chechnya. Between 1999 and 2001 some 308,912 Chechens²³ at some time or other obtained shelter in one of or other of the camps for Chechen forced migrants or in private accommodation with

relatives, which led President Murat Zyazikov of Ingushetia to remark that at times in the mini-republic the forced migrant population rivalled that of the whole resident Ingush population. Sergey Markedonov added additional weight to Zyazikov’s remarks: “*from the 1990s on account of forced migrants the population of the very small republic increased by 41% (an absolute record in Russia)*”.²⁴

Forced Migrant Camps

These are a striking present-day example of the effects of long-standing bureaucratic prejudice, inertia and sloth on the part of central government in Moscow. Amongst recent events which illustrate Ingushetia’s vulnerability to external events is the failure to achieve the resettlement to Prigorodnyy rayon of some 10,500 Ingush forced migrants (IDPs) ethnically cleansed by North Osetians in October 1992. In particular the position of the Ingush IDPs who have been living in a railway siding for 13 years by the North Osetian village of Mayskoye, located just a few kilometres to the southwest of Nazran’ is nothing short of scandalous, underscoring the federal centre’s lack of concern and resolve. 1,500 Ingush from Prigorodnyy are living in a railway siding.

Box 1 - Description of Ingush Forced Migrant Camp at Mayskoye²⁵

The camp is on a small parcel of land on North Osetian territory where 250 railway wagons are situated in which some 1,500 people live cheek by jowl. Officially the camp does not exist.

Unable to Visit Ancestors’ Graves

On a small square surrounded by wagons people came having heard about our visit. Isa Kotiyev, an elderly man in a green Muslim hat is a refugee from the village of Chernorechenskoye. He is ready to go to Chernorechenskoye straightaway, but he is not allowed there. Why? Because seven populated points of Prigorodnyy rayon are closed to the Ingush. Isa says that he cannot even go to find the cemetery where his father and grandfather are buried. For Isa to go there requires the presidents of North Osetia and Ingushetia to sign a special paper, then Isa can go by bus with a militia escort to the cemetery. Next the return journey. But when the Ingush travel in a bus and with an escort, Osetians fling stones at them. . . Therefore for three years now Isa has not gone to the cemetery of his ancestors. In Isa’s house in Chernorechenskoye refugees from South Osetia are in residence. Isa says that they have taken his house and therefore he is not permitted to go back.

Problem of Unrecognised Status

The Camp Commandant Magomed Tsurov relates that the local refugees have no status and they cannot obtain benefits. These people live on child benefits – 70 roubles per child per month. Therefore, when the debt facing the communal service becomes very large, electricity is cut off to the refugees. In summer babies and elderly women die from the heat. Since the camp is located on the territory of North Osetia, Ingushetia cannot pay for it. But North Osetia cannot pay them either because the camp is not officially on its territory. Since Beslan, Ingush are not allowed into Osetia.

Blind Bureaucracy

Tsurov went on to say that if the Federal Migration Service (FMS) accepted people as refugees and gave status to the camp, the Ingush here would have money and electricity would not be switched off. But the FMS answered all the questions, for example, “in order to award a place of concentrated accommodation for forced migrants the status of a PVR (point of temporary accommodation) must meet the appropriate conditions – light, gas, water, roads”. But in Mayskoye in the whole camp there was only one tap.

Zinanda Akhil’govaya who lives in Mayskoye has a new passport. But there is no place of registration in it. Zinanda says that she was originally registered in Vladikavkaz but now when they

changed her old passport for a new one (for this she went to Vladikavkaz) new registration was refused. Therefore she has no medical policy, she cannot go to hospital for treatment and depart from Mayskoye. Everyone living in Mayskoye has the one problem of registration. With all the rights and lack of rights they endeavour to keep their old soviet passports, in which the permit for Prigorodnyy rayon still stands.

Since 4 November 1992 despite the “*signing of more than 150 agreements and negotiations concerning the normalisation of disputed questions and improvement of relations between the peoples, conflict remains however*”²⁶. The fact that the dispute over Prigorodnyy has still not allowed the return of Ingush IDPs from the 1992 exodus²⁷ must rest jointly on the shoulders of the North Osetian leadership and more recently on the planners of the Beslan terrorist act of September 2004. However, by far the greatest culpability must lie with the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers RSFSR in 1957 when return from enforced exile of Chechens and Ingush was eventually permitted, and also in the earlier mass deportations of 1944:

*The basis of the conflict does not lie completely in the contrariness between people of different ethnicity. The essence of the evil is the Stalinist policy, the deportation of the Ingush and Chechens. Then after that territories which belonged to these people were divided amongst neighbouring republics. When Stalin died and Khrushchev arrived, the deportations were acknowledged as illegal, and people decided to return. Neighbouring regions had territory returned to them. Only Prigorodnyy rayon remained in the structure of North Osetia. And so it became a ‘delayed action mine’.*²⁸

Renewed Conflict over Prigorodnyy Rayon

Following the death of Stalin, deported peoples were allowed to return to their historic homelands. On 16 July 1956 a decree of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR was issued “*Concerning the removal of restrictions on special settlement from Chechens, Ingush, Karachay and members of their families who had been exiled in the period of the Great Patriotic War.*”²⁹ There were a significant number of deficiencies in the decree, for the removal of restrictions did not mean the return of property. People who came under the terms of the decree did not have the right to return to the original location from where they had been sent into forced exile.

Three further decrees issued by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet in early 1957 were followed by Resolution No 203 issued by the Council of Ministers RSFSR on 12 April 1957, in which much was said about the extension of credit and finance for building and repair of houses belonging to the returnees and about their freedom from agricultural taxes and dues. However, the Ingush (and incidentally Chechen-Akkin concentrated around Khasavyurt) discovered that other people had moved into their traditional territories, taking over their homes and their land. “*However the official rehabilitation did not touch Aukhovskiy rayon.*”³⁰

The seeds of acrimony were well and truly sown, and were to bring further unhappiness and conflict not only between Ingush and Osetian, but also between Ingush, Chechen and Cossack following the transfer of the largely Cossack populated rayony of Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy from Stavropol’ kray. The flurry of decrees, laws and resolutions issued in the first place between 1956 and 1960 is summarised at Appendix 1.

In what can be deemed to be the second period of inertia, the juridical foundations for the rehabilitation of nations and peoples who had been subjected to repression

by the Stalinist regime were formulated by, first a Declaration of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 14 November 1989 and two Laws of 26 April 1991 and 18 October 1991. The full range of resolutions on rehabilitation between 1989 and 1994 are listed in Appendix 1.

However, in practice the high-sounding intentions were confronted by a series of extremely difficult obstacles and problems regarding their actual implementation. Furthermore, “almost 50% of the boundaries lack the support of legal documentation”.³¹ A particular case in point was the boundary between Ingushetia and Chechnya:³² Ingushetia decided to remain within the Russian Federation as a separate republic when Chechnya decided to pursue the path of independence. Therefore in Abdulatipov’s view in “adopting the Law on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples, in the first place it was necessary to solve a mass of different problems and only at the last address the territorial ones.”³³ Abdulatipov had expressed great concern over those areas and locations where attention was immediately focussed on determining the territorial question because it made it more likely for the situation to escalate, as demonstrated later of course by the Ingush-Osetian dispute over Prigorodnyy rayon which broke out into open conflict in the autumn of 1992.

The Federal Law of 4 June 1992 “Concerning the Formation of the Ingush Republic within the Framework of the Russian Federation” rejuvenated Ingush hopes, but this new law was no exception for it made no provision for the demarcation of the new republic’s borders; the transfer of relevant state institutions,³⁴ educational facilities, centres of communication and information from the government structure and apparatus of the former Checheno-Ingush Republic in Groznyy to Nazran’, then the Ingush capital.

The Federal Law of 3 July 1992 “Concerning the Imposition of a Transitional Period of State-Territorial Delimitation in the Russian Federation” imposed a stay of execution on any further territorial changes in the Russian Federation until 1 July 1995,³⁵ but the Ingush perceived this as a betrayal by Moscow. Disregarding the government’s moratorium on border changes, the Ingush concluded an agreement with the Chechens on 23 July 1992 which provided an interim solution for their eastern border, leaving them free to concentrate on the more pressing issue of their western border, with North Osetia. Undoubtedly the Federal Laws of 4 June and 3 July 1992 were the catalysts which led to the outbreak of ethnic violence which erupted on the night of 30/31 October 1992 and continued until 6 November 1992. It became apparent that the Federal authorities were unprepared, unsympathetic and backward in fulfilling their responsibilities and obligations in ensuring the physical safety of citizens of the Russian Federation and their property. It was only on 2 November 1992, the third day of violence, that Presidential Decree RF No 1327 was issued introducing of a state of emergency on the territory of the North Osetian SSR and the Ingush Republic. A state of complete destruction and disorder reigned until 6 November.³⁶ For details, see Appendix 2.

The suspicions and entrenched hostility of Osetians and Terek Cossacks toward the Ingush, exhibited then are not ephemeral, as recent events have all too clearly shown.

Box 2 – Attitudes over Prigorodnyy Rayon in 1992³⁷**Terek Cossack Viewpoints**

Like the Ossetians, the Terek Cossacks had stopped the clock of history, but they had chosen the moment of their own glory days of the last century at which to stop it. And, even if they were helping the Moscow Russians now, they were deeply suspicious of Moscow's motives in sending troops.

Of course they were helping the Russians troops sort out the Ingushi, they said; that was their historical role. But they also had historical reasons of their own to be furious about the Ingush claim to land in Prigorodny.

Certain forces in Moscow, the forces of Soviet repression reborn, don't want the world to know that the land is ours. But it's the truth. All the villages in Prigorodny district were Cossack stanitsas in the nineteenth century. The Ingush only took over that land when the Communists chased us out. They complain that it was always their land and that it was stolen from them . . . but that's just another Soviet lie. All the land to the north and west of the Terek River has always belonged to us.

North Osetian Viewpoint

She looked a sensible woman [the North Osetian floor maid], sagging flesh encased in respectable ancient garments 'Why are the Ingush fighting?' I asked, thinking she would have a common-sense explanation. 'Because they're scum, the lowest form of humanity, the dregs,' she answered, her jaw jutting, her face hardening. 'We let them live there, although it was given to us by Stalin, in 1944, and look how they've repaid us. You can't deny history. Prigorodny is ours.'

Given the legacy of the distrust and dislike, it is not difficult to understand the reaction of North Osetians to the horrors of Beslan when a group of terrorists seized School No. 1 on 1 September 2004 and took some 1,156 people hostage. The siege ended on 3 September after a confused and chaotic firefight resulting in some 338 dead and more than 531 people hospitalised, of whom 283 were children with 93 in a serious condition.³⁸ As the perpetrators fully recognised, an act of terror such as Beslan, particularly with the involvement of at least one Ingush *boyevik*,³⁹ would bring about an immediate destabilisation⁴⁰ of the situation to the detriment of brittle relations between North Osetian and Ingush. As events turned out, the rise of a violent wave of anti-Ingush feeling throughout North Osetia negated in the short to medium term an outline agreement painstakingly reached between presidents Dzasokhov and Zyazikov on 11 October 2002.⁴¹ This had envisaged the return of those driven out in 1992, but did not refer to the larger problem stemming from 1944. At the time the rapprochement was heralded as a positive step:

*Undoubtedly there are problems, but they can be resolved, not so fast, but when it is ready. Evidence of this is the beginning of the return of Ingush refugees to their places of permanent residence in North Osetia . . . in the market of the North Osetian capital, as in the good old days, once again you can hear Ingush being spoken.*⁴²

One has often wondered which is worse. To be driven out of one's country where family roots are very deep and be forced to live a few kilometres away where a person can still see his land and property, and even important visits to graves of relatives are not allowed or considerable difficulties are encountered, or having to live far away from one's homeland.

Federal Law No. 131 - Catalyst for Ingush Protests

The catalyst which had precipitated the wave of agitation from Ingush opposition activists over Prigorodnyy in the spring of 2005 had its origins in Federal Law No

131 of 6 October 2003 “Concerning the general principles of organising local government in the RF”.⁴³ The purpose of the law was to implement clear-cut municipal reform in local government, with a schedule of the action required by central government and subjects of the Russian Federation from 1 January 2005.⁴⁴ The first requirement on the part of subjects was to establish and confirm boundaries of municipal formations, their definition and allotment of appropriate status: rural settlement, urban community, urban/town district (okrug), municipal rayon and inter-settlement territory. In general terms Federal Law No 131 envisaged an increase from the January 2005 total of 12,500 municipal formations to a new total on 1 April 2005 of 24,500 which included 2,500 town okrugs and urban settlements, almost 20,000 rural settlements and around 2,000 municipal rayony. Also by 31 March 2005, subjects should have determined afresh the number of representatives of local government formations,⁴⁵ the basis of their formation and the date of the election of heads of local authorities and deputy representatives of organs.

A crucial aspect of this new law as far as activists of the Ingush opposition were concerned was the date on which the inter-republic boundaries were to be based. Boundaries before the 1944 deportation would favour the Ingush claim on Prigorodnyy, whereas the present de facto boundaries between North Osetia and Ingushetia would continue to be detrimental to the Ingush cause. However, the Ingush Parliament had already accepted the first reading of the law concerning local government in which “*their borders were determined in relation to the present-day borders of the subject.*”⁴⁶ Moreover, underscoring the line taken by the Ingush parliament, in 2001 and 2004 the courts in Sunzhenskiy and Nazranovskiy rayony of Ingushetia, having considered the claims made by the “Akhki-yurt” movement concerning Prigorodnyy rayon, charged parliament to accept the legal requirements of the new federal law.

Subsequently, despite the protest action by Ingush opposition members which inevitably arose, the position of the Ingush parliament and government was that Prigorodnyy rayon would not be “*reclaimed by popular protest*”.⁴⁷ This was backed up by President Zyazikov’s statement to the Russian media that: “*The issue of the borders of the Ingush republic can be resolved only by legal means. The authorities will not allow rallies and other illegal actions*”,⁴⁸ and furthermore “*In Ingushetia and beyond its borders are forces which are not in agreement with the positive processes taking place in the republic, and which wish to see Ingushetia as a ‘hot spot’, the next centre of a counter-terrorist operation*”.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, amongst the activists there was a certain degree of opportunism: “*either you give us the [earlier] borders or we will not fulfil the requirements of Law No 131.*”⁵⁰ Within the concept of the new federal law there was also a requirement in the interests of ‘tidy’ bureaucracy to settle the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya, although in practice the *teip* elders of both peoples know full well where the boundaries actually lie.

Nevertheless, on the question of Prigorodnyy the Ingush decided to involve President Putin. In March 2005, State Duma deputies and senators from Ingushetia turned to him with a request for help in determining the borders between Ingushetia, North Osetia and Chechnya. Whilst little was forthcoming, the following week a similar approach was also made to Dmitriy Kozak, President Putin’s Personal Representative (PolPred) to the Southern Federal Okrug (YuFo) to give attention to “*the return of Prigorodnyy rayon to the composition and structure of the republic.*”⁵¹ Accordingly, Kozak set about producing a plan for “*Urgent combined actions on the normalisation of the Osetian-Ingush conflict of October-November 1992*”

in conjunction with the Federal Migration Service. This document contained details of 'who', 'where' and 'when' the responsible authorities, and a mechanism for the solution of territorial disputes between republics. It also proposed that those who were not in agreement with the present borders of republics should contest them in the Constitutional Court.⁵²

Attempts at Mass Protest in Nazran'

The last thing President Zyazikov wanted was a manifestation of untidy public discussion, dissension or protest which could lead to further disorder in the streets and maybe even rebellion, especially anything reminiscent of the coordinated raids, subsequent chaos and disorder in June 2004 when *boyeviki* from Chechnya attacked Nazran' and Karabulak. Incidents of a similar nature could further damage his public image, already dented by Moscow's machinations in 2002 to install him as president,⁵³ or remind the public of his inability to halt incursions into the republic by law enforcement agencies based in Chechnya, which also invited unfavourable comparisons with former President Ruslan Aushev. Media speculated about the possibility of yet one more change of president, this time in Ingushetia. "*Is a Kirgiz scenario possible in Russia?*"⁵⁴ The media already having noted Zyazikov's low profile during the events of 21/22 June 2004 and the Beslan siege in September 2004,⁵⁵ did not hesitate to speculate about the absence of Zyazikov over the weekend just prior to his meeting with President Putin in the presidential residence by the Black Sea on 3 April 2005.

For the Ingush activist, the prospect of Federal Law No 131 becoming fully implemented had led to attempts to hold protest meetings and demonstrations in Nazran' from 28 March and throughout 2005. Local opposition movements had the support of almost all the republic's *teips*. Initially the meeting was planned to take place at the memorial to the victims of political repression in the area of Abu-Gub in Nazran'. However, some time before the meeting was due to start a column of military vehicles and armour had moved out from Mozdok through the *stanitsa* of Voznesenovskaya to Nazran' where a cordon of Foreign Ministry Ingushetian special purpose troops had been deployed around the memorial blocking the approaches: "*the opposition were many times fewer than the people with weapons*".⁵⁶ As a result, the meeting took place on the road in front of the memorial. One of the leaders of the public-political movement "Akhki-Yurt" who had organised the meeting, Boris Arsamakov, was arrested on the approaches to the meeting, and as a consequence the meeting was taken over by Musa Ozdoyev, a deputy of the Ingush National Assembly, the editor in chief of the opposition paper "*Angushl'*", Murat Oziyev and other leaders of 'Akhki-Yurt'. By the end of April Zyazikov managed to extract an undertaking from opposition activists to refrain from public meetings until September 2005.

The Future

The meeting on 6 April 2005 arranged by Dmitriy Kozak at Rostov-on-Don with presidents Aleksandr Dzasokhov and Murat Zyazikov terminated in argument. The president of North Osetia unexpectedly refused to sign the plan for "*Urgent joint actions on the normalisation of the Osetian-Ingush conflict of October-November 1992*" which had been prepared under Kozak's direction. Dzasokhov argued that the document had no financial base or provision and furthermore had the potential to spark off a further spiral of tension, unrest, violence and armed conflict in North Osetia. This led to Dzasokhov's departure from office. His position had already been terminally weakened by certain aspects of the Beslan siege the previous year, but his successor Taymraz Mamsurov found himself in exactly the same position.

Apart from the impossibility of the North Osetia leadership agreeing to the Kozak plan as a result of Beslan, there were a whole host of other factors which would have been difficult to circumvent, their roots being based to a large extent in the movement of South Osetians from Georgia, lack of land, other social factors and historic attitudes.⁵⁷

The failure to obtain a North Osetian signature to the Kozak initiative must also be seen in the wider context of the slow progress of implementing Federal Law No. 131, together with the two decrees introduced by President Putin on 13 September 2004, “*On urgent measures to increase the effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism*” and “*On the creation of a commission [i.e. the Kozak Commission] for coordinating the activities of federal executive power in organs in the YuFO*”.

Delayed Implementation of Federal Law No. 131

It will be remembered that between the summer of 2001 and the autumn of 2003 Kozak had been the driving force for reform as head of the federal commission on the demarcation of powers between the federal centre and the regions with regard to local government. Federal Law No. 131 was originally due to come into force on 1 January 2006. On 22 September 2005 it became known that the implementation of municipal reform in some cases had been postponed until 2009.⁵⁸ According to Mikhail Grishankov, a deputy from “*Yedinaya Rossiya*”, the delay was due to the necessity of extending the transitional period to resolve not only problems connected with the responsibilities of municipal formations, but also because of inter-budgetary implications. Moreover, Grishankov added that “*today only 30-40% of Russian regions were ready for municipal reform*”.⁵⁹

Whilst a breathing space of three years may help to calm tempers over the Ingush return to Prigorodnyy in the short term, the problem of injustice to the Ingush with regard to up-dated municipal boundaries will not disappear. At least Kozak tried to push for the return of Ingush IDPs. The recent announcements of cooperation between parliamentary delegations of Ingushetia and North Osetia to normalise the situation regarding the 1992 conflict offers a glimmer, albeit a very weak one of distant light.⁶⁰ Opposition is beginning to mount against Kozak on account of his intentions to curb corruption amongst the regional political elites.

Growing Opposition to Kozak

Kozak, described a year ago as “*a man who stands apart*” in his determination “*to extirpate the clan system in government*”⁶¹ and more recently measures to correct the systemic crisis in regional government by direct central control over budget allocation and disbursement,⁶² is now beginning to encounter waves of orchestrated opposition both from within the region and Moscow.⁶³

*Regional leaders of the North Caucasus have begun an open and active campaign of opposition to the ‘insidious’ schemes of the presidential representative Dmitriy Kozak concerning external administration in the subsidised regions of the South of Russia. The logic of this idea of the polpred is absolutely clear and justified: if Moscow pays a region some 80-90% of the local budget, then it has the right to expect in return loyalty and support for its policies. But the regional leaders have their own special opinion on this account.*⁶⁴

Those opposing his scheme included Murat Zyazikov of Ingushetia, Alu Alkhanov of Chechnya and also the governors of Krasnodar and Stavropol’ kraya with Aleksandr

Tkachev of Krasnodar stating that “*it is not possible to effectively administer the regions from Moscow*”.⁶⁵ Table 4 below illustrates the scale of subsidies to the North Caucasus regions from the centre, and the place that these regions occupy compared to other subjects in the Russian Federation.

Table 4 – The Most Subsidised Subjects of South Russia⁶⁶

Subject of RF	Share of Budget Transfers %	Place in Federal Rating of Subsidies	Head of Region
Ingushetia	88.3	2	Murat Zyazikov
Dagestan	81.3	4	Magomedali Magomedov
Chechnya	79.4	6	Alu Alkhanov
Kabardino-Balkar	73.4	7	Arsen Kanokov
Karachayev-Cherkessia	62.5	11	Mustafa Batdiyev
North Osetia	59.2	14	Taymuraz Mamsurov
Adygeya	58.1	15	Khazret Sovmen

Ingushetia is the most subsidised region in the North Caucasus, in fact in the all-Russia context it is only marginally behind Tuva.⁶⁷ Zyazikov has already expressed his view about the inexpediency of introducing external administration to control the allocation of subsidies. Alu Alkhanov, President of Chechnya, expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the statement that Chechnya was one of the most highly subsidised regions, emphasising that Chechnya’s budget amounted to US\$10 mlrd whilst the income from the extraction of Chechen oil was US\$15 mlrd.

Subsequently there have been indications of a less draconian approach from the centre, for at a meeting chaired by Kozak in Kislovodsk on 2 December 2005, in considering the possible use of mechanisms for external control in Tuva, Ingushetia and Dagestan he explained that: “*The external control does not mean the termination of the authority of organs belonging to federation subjects . . . it means only the introduction of additional measures for the disbursement of budgetary means, and no more*”.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, the fact that the North Caucasus has the highest number of civil servants in Europe (1,180 bureaucrats per 100,000 population)⁶⁹ emphasises the requirement to reduce administrative costs. Financial and manpower savings could possibly be made by re-uniting Ingushetia and Chechnya as Kozak has suggested and then allowing a newly constituted Checheno-Ingush Republic the full income from oil extraction on its territory. This would go some way to reducing the drain of money from Moscow, but it would not remove clan power. A reconstituted republic embracing both Chechnya and Ingushetia could however provide a more economically balanced administrative-territorial unit, noting the building boom in Ingushetia,⁷⁰ the new ‘shining’ capital of Magas, and the industrial chemical works at Malgobek.

Chechen Covetousness

From the Chechen point of view, in addition to the industrial and economic advantages that could accrue from a re-unification, the creation of a new Checheno-Ingush Republic would fulfil the aim of a united Vaynakh territory, a project close to the heart of the late Chechen President Akhmad-Khadzhi Kadyrov.⁷¹ Consequently a degree of speculation has arisen after the recent expansionist pronouncements of his son Ramzan Kadyrov (First Deputy Prime Minister), to the effect that one of the first tasks of the newly elected parliament would be the enlargement of his republic's living space for:

The solution of this task has dragged on for around 15 years – over this time anyone who wished to move the border, and the territory of Chechnya over these years has significantly been reduced . . . Both in neighbouring regions, as in Chechnya itself it is well known where the border ran before amalgamation⁷² and where it must run after delimitation . . . We do not need one square metre of anyone else's territory, but we do not have a single square metre of our own to spare. We naturally wish to be master of our own land.⁷³

As noted by Svetlana Samoylova: “Such an announcement is extremely dangerous from the point of view of regional relations with neighbouring Ingushetia and Dagestan. Kadyrov did not speak about concrete territories, but the question is about Sunzhenskiy rayon which passed to Ingushetia in 1992.”⁷⁴

It will be remembered that in 1992 the Chechen government established the border along the boundary line of 1934. In 1993 Ruslan Aushev and Dzhokhar Dudayev signed a separate agreement in which Sunzhenskiy rayon was transferred to Ingushetia, whilst the populated points of Sernovodsk and Assinovskaya remained in Chechnya. Following the death of Dudayev in 1996 Chechen territorial claims towards Ingushetia were re-ignited: both Ingush and Chechens now consider Sunzhenskiy rayon to belong to them.⁷⁵ In January 2001 a Chechen Sunzhenskiy rayon was formed with an administrative centre in Sernovodsk. The area of the Ingush Sunzhenskiy rayon is 881 sq km, but there is oil there.

Kadyrov is now acting Prime Minister in the absence of Sergey Abramov through injuries sustained as a result of a motor accident in Moscow on 17 November 2005: rumours are that Abramov will not be returning to Chechnya as he has been appointed governor of Volgograd.⁷⁶ It should also be noted that whilst the establishment *Yedinaya Rossiya* party attained more than 60% of the votes cast in the recent Chechen parliamentary elections, it is the people of Kadyrov junior who hold the real power. Kadyrov not only controls the power structures, but also in his capacity as head of the cabinet of ministers controls huge sums flowing into the republic. He will be 30 years old in October 2006, making him eligible for the presidency. Alu Alkhanov has all but announced his willingness to transfer the presidency to Kadyrov. During Alkhanov's absences, Kadyrov has fulfilled the responsibilities of Chechen President.

It is unlikely that, having ‘enjoyed’ an independent existence away from Grozny, Ingushetia would welcome any moves for incorporation into Chechnya: “*Though the languages and traditional customs of the Ingush and Chechen are closely related (the languages are about as close as Portuguese and Spanish), the Ingush have a centuries-old national identity separate from the Chechen and have been politically separate whenever they have made their own political decisions.*”⁷⁷

Former President Aushev in 1992 said that he was categorically against two nations living in one house.

Indications of Cossacks Returning to Ingushetia

Recently, in contrast to the large exodus of Cossacks and Russians from Chechnya, Daghestan and the lands north of the River Terek there is some evidence of their return to Ingushetia, to the three longstanding Cossack *stanitsy* of Ordzhonikidzeyevskaya, Troytskaya and Nesterovskaya located in the Sunzhenskiy rayon lying close to the Chechen border. In the 1980s and 1990s some 40,000 Russians left Ingushetia, with a peak occurring between 1992 and 1995. Now, whilst only some 2,000 can be mustered in Ingushetia, there are the beginnings of a reverse process, which could grow if the press did not continue to label Ingushetia as a “front line republic”. People simply want to return home. Borisov describes the stanitsa of Ordzhonikidzeyevskaya (in the past known as Sleptsovskaya) as being more like a small town than a large village with: “*Wide streets, two to three storey administrative buildings, a large palace of culture, several schools, a park and luxuriant market, a wander in it is a real experience of stability. Old Cossack adobe houses with traditional shuttered windows and new Ingush red brick under galvanised roofs. Each house has the indispensable garden with a vegetable patch and a large internal yard entwined with grape vines.*”⁷⁸

Undoubtedly, President Murat Zyazikov has been instrumental in bringing about measures to improve the situation in Ingushetia. The Ingush Republic’s special programme “*The return and arrangements for people for the years 2003-2010 who had earlier lived in the Ingush Republic*” is being developed by the administration of Sunzhenskiy rayon in concert with the Ingush Economics Ministry. In the words of President Zyazikov: “*The theme of this programme is not actually only for Ingushetia, but without exclusion for all the North Caucasus Republics. We have all been, unfortunately, witnesses of the fact that someone is trying to sow enmity between nations who have lived together over centuries in peace and good neighbourliness.*”⁷⁹

Amongst the measures was the “*establishment of a Cossack trading house as the main mechanism for creating work places as a source for financing the construction of living accommodation*”.⁸⁰ However, encouraging Cossacks to resettle in Ingushetia could lead to further differences of opinion within the republic and most certainly between the Ingushetian President and de facto Chechen leadership.

Conclusions

On account of its size Ingushetia will always be at the mercy of its larger neighbours and the federal centre.

An immense amount of careful and intricate negotiations will be needed in order to return the 10,500 Ingush refugees from the 1992 North Osetian – Ingush conflict to Prigorodnyy rayon. There is a distant faint gleam of hope if parliamentarians of North Osetia and Ingushetia can cooperate to work out and implement a plan for the return.

However, it is unlikely that the Ingush would happily accept amalgamation with their Chechen cousins. The borders between Ingushetia and Chechnya are to say the least untidy and legally undefined. There is the strong possibility that if Kadyrov pushes the Chechen case too hard, this problem along with the one over Daghestan’s boundaries could add further fuel to the tense situation in the North Caucasus. Implementation of unpopular external budgetary control measures

envisaged by plenipotentiary Dmitriy Kozak could further inflame the North Caucasus.

Endnotes

- ¹ <http://www.sovsekretno.ru/2004/08/5.html> *Soversheno Sekretno – Sekrety Voyny* “Nazran”, 22 *Iyunya* by Iosif Gal’perin.
- ² <http://www.ingushetia.ru/about/index.html> “O respublike – Sotsial’no-Ekonomicheskoye Kharakteristiki”.
- ³ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 222, 16 October 2003 page 2 “Akhmad Kadyrov zamakhnulsya na granitsy by Milrad Fatullayev.
- ⁴ See C W Blandy “North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching Destabilisation” CSRC, Caucasus Series 05/36, August 2005 pages 5 to 7.
- ⁵ V. M. Kabuzan “Naseleniye Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX – XX vekakh – Ethnostaticheskoye issledovaniye” “Russko-Baltiyskiy informatsionniy tsentr” 1996, extracted from Table 43. page 175.
- ⁶ *Ibid* page 214, detail extracted from Table 72
- ⁷ *Ibid* page 215 detail extracted from Table 73.
- ⁸ See Blandy “Prigorodnyy Rayon: The Continuing Dispute P26, CSRC, 1997.
- ⁹ E. D. Muzhukhoyeva “Checheno-Ingushetiya v Administrativno-Politicheskoy sisteme upravleniya Terskoy oblasti v 40 – 60 gody XIX Veka” page 64 in “Checheno-Ingushetiya v Politicheskoy istorii Rossii i Kavkaza v dorevolutsionnom proshlom” ed A. I. Khasbulatov, Checheno-Ingushskiy nauchno-issledovatel’skiy institut istorii, ekonomiki, sotsilologii i filologii.
- ¹⁰ According to <http://www.cossackweb.com> “Cossack Web – Calvary of Terek Cossackdom” from May 1918 onwards the ‘peoples commissars’ adopted a policy of eliminating Cossack *stanitsy* along the Sunzha line with the Bol’sheviki organising punitive actions and raids using the Ingush. Tens of thousands of inhabitants were forcibly evicted from their homes and chased to the distant north. More repression against Cossacks was to follow in the spring of 1920 when the Cossack *stanitsa* of Kalinovskaya was torched to the ground and other *stanitsy* were handed over to Chechens: 18 settlements and some 60,000 people were eliminated. In April 1921, some 70,000 Cossacks, mainly old people, women and children “were chased on a death march to Beslan railroad station. Mounted groups, later labelled as ‘obdurate mountaineers’ combined as guard/escort troops, just in one day on 17 April murdered approximately 35,000 people. According to one witness the River Kambilevskaya ran with blood.”
- ¹¹ Kamaludin Gadzhiyev “Geopolitika Kavkaza”, Moskva, “Mezhdurodniye Otnosheniya”, 2001, page 50.
- ¹² Kabuzan op. cit., page 114.
- ¹³ The Ingush historical claim rested on four main points, first that Prigorodnyy rayon belonged to Ingushetia long before the 1944 deportations. Second, Prigorodnyy rayon contains 33% of Ingush historic non-mountain land, i.e. cultivatable land. A salient point for the Ingush, with their active perceptions of ancestral (*teip*) land, was the relationship between territory and ancestors. Third, there were significant Ingush populations in key villages. Fourth, Vladikavkaz was a primary urban area for the Ingush, their major political, economic and cultural centre
- ¹⁴ Kabuzan. op cit.
- ¹⁵ *Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia* Tom 28, 1937, page 65. The entry also gives the Akkin the additional name of Aukhovtsy.
- ¹⁶ See C W Blandy “Daghestan: The Storm Part 3 – The Expulsion of Chechen Bandit Formations from Novolakskiy Rayon” P33, CSRC, October 2000, page 5.
- ¹⁷ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docid=611481> Kommersant 23 September 2005, “Krem’l’ otkazhet ingushami v territorial’noy rehabilitatsii” by Musa b-Muradov, Zaur b-Farniyev, Diana b-Dadasheva.
- ¹⁸ <http://www.ingushetia.ru/about/index.html> Respublika Ingushetia – Social and Economic Characteristics.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*.
- ²⁰ <http://www.perepis2002.ru//index.html?id=7> All Russia Population Census 2002, 9 October 2002, p 10.

²¹ <http://www.kavkaz-forum.ru/society/3200.html> “*Rekonstruktsiya Chechni*”, 3 March 2005; “Ulitsa Kadyrova” by Aron Tsy-pin: “It is difficult to say what part of the 1.3 million Chechens live outside the borders of Chechnya. Official statistics speak about 300,000 Chechens. Present day Chechen businessmen in Moscow (according to the certain data they number 200,000 people) are fully absorbed into Russian business and in Russian society: . . . significant diasporas exist in Russia’s regions”. Extracted digest: Volgograd oblast’ approximately 40,000; Rostov oblast’ 25,000; Yaroslavl oblast’ around 8,000; in Tambov oblast’ 4,000; in Tuymen oblast’ around 40,000. A large part of the Chechen diaspora lives in Orel, Tver and Ivanov oblasts.

²² Map based on *Kommersant* No 179, 23 September 2005, “*Kreml’ otkazhet ingushami v territorial’ noy rehabilitatsii*”, by Musa b-Muradov, Zaur b-Farniyev. Contrary to map detail concerning the allocation of land from Stavropol’ kray this did not happen until the rehabilitation of the Chechno-Ingush ASSR in 1957. See K.S. Gadzhiev “*Geopolitika Kavkaza*”, Moskva “*Mezhnunarodnyye Otnosheniya*”, 2001, Page 50 “The question is about the former, before 1944, Cossack royny of Stavropol’ kray – Naurskiy, Shelkovskiy and Kargalinskiy, which in 1957 were included in the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR.”

²³ Caucasus Foundation “Chechen Refugees Question” Report of the Caucasus Foundation by Fehim Tastekin, October 2001, Page 1

²⁴ <http://www.kavkaz-forum.ru/politic/10496.html> 9 June 2005 “*Kto reshit bol’shiye problemy malen’koy Ingushetii?*” by Sergey Markedonov.

²⁵ http://kommersan.ru/k-vlast/get_page.asp?page_id=20051710-5.htm *Kommersant-Vlast*’ 02 May 2005 “*Prigorodnyy tupik*” by Ol’ga Allenova.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ See Blandy “Prigorodnyy Rayon: The Continuing Dispute (The Triangular Relationship of North Osetia, Ingushetia and Russia) CSRC P26 September 1997.

²⁸ http://www.newizv.ru/news/?id_news=14188&date=2004-10-29 *Novyye Izvestia* “*Ruslan Aushev ‘My stanovimsya izgoyami v Rossii’*” by Sergey Tkachuk.

²⁹ Magomed Kurbanov, Candidate of Philosophical Science, Editor-in-Chief of the Republic Journal “*Narody Dagestana*”, “*Repressii protiv narodov Dagestana: Problemy rehabilitatsii*”, *Tsentral’naya Azia i Kavkaz* No 6 (24), 2002, page 166

³⁰ Kurbanov, op cit.

³¹ “*Konstitutsii ustavy I dogovory – Sub’yektov Federatsii na Severnom Kavkaz*”, by Damir Yusufovich Shapsugov, Doctor of Jurisprudence, professor, academician AMAN, Zhanna Iosifovna Ovsepyan, Doctor of Jurisprudence, and others, Rostov-na-Donu: Izdatel’stvo SKAGS, 1998, page 38.

³² See C W Blandy “*Chechen Connections: An End to Conflict in Chechnya*” P25 CSRC August 1997 pages 39-40 Boxes 22 and 23.

³³ Ovsepyan and Shapsugov page 38.

³⁴ Charles Blandy “*Chechen Connections: An End to Conflict in Chechnya?*”, P25, CSRC, August 1997, pages 38 to 42. See Dmitriy Bal’burov, *Moskovskiy Novosti* No. 6, 9 February 1997: “Chechnya and Ingushetia had a contiguous border only in the mountains in the rayon of Bamut and Arshty. The plains settlements of Assinovskaya, Sleptovskaya and Michurinskaya were in the Cossack okrug. In early 1930s the Cossack okrug came under Chechnya. In 1934 it was passed to Ingushetia. With the transfer in 1934 of the Cossack okrug to Ingushetia, there should have been no doubt as to the legal ownership of the settlements of Sleptovskaya, Assinovskaya and Arshty, for juridically these settlements are situated on the territory of Sunzhenskiy rayon. Other defects in law on the formation of the Ingush Republic were directly concerned with the administration of settlements such as Samashki and Assinovskaya which were subordinated to the Chechen government, but the payment of wages, salaries and pensions was carried out through Nazran’. With regard to mutual border alignment both Aslan Maskhadov and Ruslan Aushev believed that sooner or later this problem requires a more concrete decision.”

³⁵ Initially it was for a three year period which was amended to 5 years in November 1992.

³⁶ See Blandy “*Prigorodnyy Rayon: The Continuing Dispute*” P26, CSRC, September 1997 page 12.

³⁷ Vanora Bennett “*Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya*” Picador, 1998.

³⁸ Henry Plater-Zyberk, “Beslan – Lessons Learned?” CSRC Russian Series 04/34, November 2004, page 5.

³⁹ Ibid. In fact nine Ingush were involved.

- ⁴⁰ See C W Blandy “Chechnya After Beslan”, CSRC, Caucasus Series 04/27, September 2004. “The spectre of another wave of violence almost became a reality on Sunday 5 September when North Osetians attempted to initiate a pogrom against Ingush houses in Prigorodnyy rayon. The authorities succeeded in preventing inter-ethnic clashes, but the situation is being controlled with difficulty.”
- ⁴¹ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 220, 15 October 2002 page 5 “*Pervyy vernyy shag*” by Artur Atayev.
- ⁴² *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 223, 17 October 2003, page 9, “*Dzheyrah na vse vremena*” by Ol’ga Mishina and Vladimir Terekhov. The agreement however, only included those who had lost their homes in the more recent conflict of 1992. It did not attempt to rectify the far deeper and emotive situation pertaining to those who had lost their homes and possessions in 1944 as a result of the mass-deportations to Central Asia and Siberia.
- ⁴³ <http://www.rg.ru/2003/10/08/zakonsamouprav.html>
- ⁴⁴ Ibid. Chapter 12 “Transitional positions, Article 85. Ensuring the realisation of the provisions of the present law” pages 79 to 83.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid. “Chapter 6 Organs of local self government and officials of local self government, Article 35. Representative organs of a municipal formation. The number of deputies of representative organs of a settlement/community, including an urban/town district is determined by the regulation of a municipal formation and cannot be less than: 7 per 1,000 people; 10 for 1,000 to 10,000; 15 for 10,000 to 30,000; 20 for 30,000 to 100,000; 25 for 100,000 to 500,000; 35 for populations higher than 500,000. The number of deputies for a municipal rayon cannot be less than 15 people. Likewise for the internal territory of a town of federal importance cannot be less than 10 people.
- ⁴⁶ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=568337> 08 April 2005, “*Dmitriy Kozak oseknya na Osetii*” by Alla b-Barakhova and Natal’ya b-Gorodetskaya.
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Appendix 1

Table 5 – Return and Rehabilitation of Deported Peoples

Summary of Decrees, Laws and Resolutions Issued Between 1956 - 1960⁸¹

Date	Decree, Law or Resolution
16 Jul 56	“Concerning the removal of restrictions on special settlement from Chechens, Ingush, Karachay and members of their families who had been exiled in the period of the Great Patriotic War”
9 Jan 57	No. 721/4 “Concerning the rehabilitation of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR and abolition of Groznenskaya oblast’ No 149/14 “Concerning the rehabilitation of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR in the composition of the RSFSR”
11 Feb 57	6 th Session of the Supreme Soviet accepted the law “Concerning the rehabilitation of the national autonomy of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR”
12 Apr 57	Resolution No. 203 was issued from the Council of Ministers RSFSR: “Concerning the granting of privileges and the rendering of assistance to members of collective farms, workers and office workers, who have been returned to Checheno-Ingushetia and the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, the Kalmyk and Karachayevo-Cherkess autonomous oblasts of Stavropol’ Kray and to the Daghestan ASSR and in certain rayony of the North Osetian ASSR, the Astrakhan and Rostov oblasts”
1957	Checheno-Ingush ASSR received the Cossack rayony of Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy from Stavropol’ Kray as compensation for the loss of Prigorodnyy
28 Feb 58	No. 197 “Concerning measures on economic and cultural-social structure of the population resettled from the Checheno-Ingush ASSR to the Daghestan ASSR”
18 Apr 58	Request to adopt a resolution about the resettlement of Chechens from the Kirgiz and Kazakh SSRs to Daghestan and about their economic situation. There was also an additional request to change the resettlement of the remaining families of repressed Chechen-Akkin to 1959
16 Jul 58	“Concerning the repressed Chechen population from Kirgiz and Kazakh SSRs and its economic administration in the Republic”

**Table 6 – Resolutions on Rehabilitation
and Change of Administrative Status 1989-1994**⁸²

Date	Details of Resolutions, Declarations and Laws
14 Nov 89	Declaration of Supreme Soviet USSR “Concerning acknowledgement of all acts by illegal and criminal means against peoples subjected to violent resettlement and the guarantee of their rights”
11 Dec 90	Assembly of Peoples Deputies RSFSR “Concerning the victims of political repression in the RSFSR” on the importance “of working out and adopting legal acts concerning rehabilitation and the full restoration of rights of repressed peoples and citizens of the RSFSR” ⁸³
26 Apr 91	Law of RSFSR: “Concerning the rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples”
18 Oct 91	<p>Law of RSFSR: “Concerning the rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression” with changes in 1992, 1995.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Article 3 envisaged “the restoration of territorial integrity” in the form as it existed before deportation and compensation for loss caused by the state⁸⁴ • Article 6 envisaged “the realisation of lawful and organised measures on the restoration of former borders”⁸⁵
4 Jun 92	Russian Federation Law: “Concerning the Creation of a Separate Ingush Republic” ⁸⁶
3 Jul 92	Russian Federation Law: “Concerning the establishment of a transitional period on state-territorial demarcation”, includes a three year moratorium on border changes from July 1992 to 1 July 1995
16 Jul 92	Act of Russian Federation: “Concerning the rehabilitation of Cossacks”
15 Mar 93	Presidential decree “Concerning the reformation of military structures, border service and internal troops on the territory of the North Caucasus region and state support of Cossack society”
25 Dec 93	Presidential decree “Concerning measures for the rehabilitation of the Kalmyk nation and state support for its rebirth and development”
3 Mar 94	Presidential decree “Concerning measures for the rehabilitation of the Balkar nation and state support for its rebirth and development”
3 Mar 94	Presidential decree “Concerning measures for the rehabilitation of the Karachay nation and state support for its rebirth and development”

Appendix 2

Table 7 – Casualties and Damage in Prigorodnyy Rayon Between 30 Oct – 6 Nov 92⁸⁷

Killed		Wounded		Hostages with Opponents	
Total: 540		Total: 606		Total: 2200	
Osetian	Ingush	Osetian	Ingush	Osetian	Ingush
105	407	148	168	600	1600
Others: 34		Others: 20			
Homes Destroyed During Ethnic Violence (2,795)			Houses Partially Destroyed (397)		
Ingush	North Osetian	Russian	Ingush	North Osetian	Russian
2,500	248	31	239	138	31
Refugees, Forced Migrants and Subsequent Disposal					
Ingush Forced Migrants		Osetian Forced Migrants			
From Prigorodnyy	To Ingushetia	From	Within	Remarks	
		Late 80s/90s from South Osetia up to 75,000 refugees.			
50,000 to Ingushetia	50,000 Ingush accommodated at Nazran'		In 1972 – 7,500 Osetians homeless in North Osetia		
			In 1992 – 26,000 South Osetians had right to live in Prigorodnyy		
By 1 Jan 97 – 10,834 Ingush returned to Prigorodnyy.	By 1 Jan 97 – 39,000 remained in Ingushetia.				Ingush returned to Kurtat, Dongaron, Dachnoye and Chermen

Endnotes

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Want to Know More ...?

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ISBN 1-905058-53-5

Published By:

**Defence Academy of the
United Kingdom**

Conflict Studies Research Centre

Defence Academy of the UK
Watchfield
Swindon
SN6 8TS
England

Telephone: (44) 1793 788856
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ISBN 1-905058-53-5