Russian Perspectives of Russia-EU Security Relations

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August 2005
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Key Points

* A broad security dialogue has developed between Russia and the EU, addressing a range of military and soft security issues. It is facilitated by a dense institutionalised network of consultation mechanisms.

* In military security, there are several apparently coincidental interests, including crisis management, the sale of Russian military technology to the EU, counter-terrorism and preventing the proliferation of WMD.

* Soft security is an important but often overlooked area of Russia-EU security cooperation. This also began to develop in the early 1990s and a range of mechanisms have been established to facilitate cooperation in issues such as border control, combating organised crime, nuclear safety and environmental protection.

* However, practical cooperation has remained localised, fragmented and inconsistent. Many of the apparently coincidental interests are more competitive or conflicting than really cooperative. Moreover, few on either side actively push the development of the relationship.

* The failure to develop the practical side of the relationship has generated increasing frustration in Russia. The atmosphere has soured of late, and many consider the EU to pose a potentially greater threat to Russian security than NATO.

* A basis for the relationship exists and now needs to be built upon. Plans need to be translated into practical action. The aim should be to build up a bank of small scale success stories.
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The Russia-EU relationship has reached an important stage. EU enlargement has highlighted a range of important elements in the relationship, not least the lengthening of the Russia-EU common border – and the surrounding of Kaliningrad by EU member states. The intensification of the EU’s defence and security policy (ESDP) has brought the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the common neighbourhood right to the fore as an issue in Russia-EU relations. Tension has flared as the two sides have approached the situations in Moldova and the Ukraine from opposite positions and with diverging aims.

Rising levels of disappointment have also forced both sides to re-examine the relationship. Planned projects have not taken off, fuelling disappointment on both sides. Mutual recriminations abound, and trust is at a premium. Officials and analysts on the EU side are critical of the progress made, and becoming pessimistic about the prospects for developing the relationship. They are also critical of the domestic situation in Russia itself.

In Russia there is sensitivity about the criticisms levelled by the EU at Moscow for its human rights record and issues of media freedom and democracy. There is also disappointment with the Europeans who 'do not listen' to Russian views, and a relationship which has hardly developed beyond many beautiful words. The EU has other priorities, including enlargement and internal issues, and Russia does not feature as highly on the EU’s agenda as Moscow thinks it should. On the other hand, the EU is dropping off Russia's radar as a security partner. Indeed, in Russia, the EU is losing its idealised position compared to NATO, and the impression among some of the Russian elite that the EU poses a potentially greater threat to Russian security than NATO is becoming more apparent. Although the EU has only limited military capabilities, some argue that the EU threatens Russia much more completely with isolation than does NATO. The EU Commission and Council documents of 2004, which critically assessed the state of the relationship, were illustrative of stricter and more demanding EU tones towards Russia, according to one leading Russian analyst, providing a basis for policies that 'almost proclaim a new strategy of pseudo-deterrence'. Sergei Karaganov stated that the documents were written in a 'harsh and sometimes provocative tone ... I did not find ... even the slightest reciprocal steps that would take Russia's interests into consideration – not as the EU sees them but as Russia sees them.'

Nonetheless, this scenario of longer common borders and a common neighbourhood has meant that the Russia-EU security relationship is increasingly important for both sides and for the future of European security. In fact, Russia and the EU share many mutual security interests, and both sides pursue a number of common goals. The Russia-EU security relationship is highly institutionalised, based on the framework Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) document signed in 1994
and in force since 1997, and enhanced through subsequent strategies adopted by both sides and by joint declarations. Overall, in fact, the Russia-EU relationship is the most institutionalised relationship the EU has with a third party. This has facilitated a broad security dialogue and some practical cooperation in both military and soft security dimensions.

This paper examines Russian perspectives of the security relationship, first looking at the military dimension, and then the 'soft security' dimension. It concludes by arguing that the problems in the relationship run deep: not only does the relationship lack common values – the point most often highlighted by western analysts – but in many cases interests differ also. Moreover, there is considered to be little support on either side for actively developing the relationship. Nonetheless, the relationship is too important for both sides simply to let it continue to drift into mutual disappointment. The belated signing of the Four Common Spaces Road Maps in May 2005 has provided a renewed political framework in which projects can be launched. One interest that does coincide is crucial – dividing lines should not be allowed to re-develop in Europe, across which the EU and Russia nurture their differences. The two sides must continue the long process of converting the confrontation of the Cold War into a collaborative relationship that enhances European stability by building up a bank of small-scale success stories to give practical momentum to the relationship.

**Russia-EU Military Security Cooperation**

The Russia-EU military relationship began in 1994 with the development of a Russia-WEU relationship. Although low profile in comparison to the Russia-NATO and Russia-OSCE relationships, this laid out the broad outlines of fields for military cooperation between Russia and the EU. It included the sale of Russian satellite technology and strategic airlift assets to the WEU, discussions about combined fleet and peacekeeping operations (Russia was invited to observe the WEU’s CRlSEX 98 exercise), and the development of tactical missile defence cooperation. More importantly, frameworks for dialogue were founded, including the invitation extended to Russia to send a delegation to the WEU.

Since 1998–9, Russian attention has focused on CFSP and ESDP. The October 2001 Summit announced the Joint Declaration on Stepping Up Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters, which underlined political progress being made through an increasingly broad spectrum of discussions, and the dense nature of diplomatic links. Stipulating the necessity to exploit existing links as much as possible, it also established a new format of monthly meetings between Russia and the EU's Political and Security Committee (COPS) to assess crisis prevention and management. Arrangements for possible Russian participation in crisis-management operations of a civilian and military nature would be developed according to progress made in the ESDP. The EU also agreed to fund bilateral mine-clearing cooperation, such as the Russo-Swedish project to clear World War Two mines from the Baltic around the Kaliningrad region. In May 2002, the decision was taken to dispatch a representative of Russia's Ministry of Defence (MO) to Brussels to 'maintain operative communications' between Russia and the EU. Other issues, such as the prospects for Russia-EU cooperation in the military and military-technical spheres, cooperation between the fleets of Russia and the EU and the possibility of joint conduct of peacekeeping operations were further discussed. Since then, a joint declaration on countering terrorism was adopted at the November 2002 Summit. Vassily Likhachyov, then-permanent Russian
amassador to the EU, considered this a ‘principally important step, which laid a
new basis for coordination of the joint efforts of both sides in the struggle against
international and regional terrorism’. Other areas of cooperation have included
counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the establishment
of tactical missile defence.

Very little actual cooperation has taken place, however. Sales of Russian satellite
imagery have been very low level. Neither has there been success in the sale of
Russian strategic airlift capabilities to the EU. Discussions to establish a
European tactical missile defence have not progressed. Most negotiations on
missile defence have been with the USA. NATO has provided the main forum for
discussing European missile defence. The EU is rarely mentioned. Three main
problems have stood out, according to leading Russian military experts. First, there
is a lack of trust between Russia and Western Europe. Second, the plans are
flawed: questions remain, for example, over why Western Europe has been offered a
tactical, but not strategic, missile defence. Finally, Western Europe is not believed
to be really interested: given the lack of perceived threat of direct missile and
nuclear attack, it was probably ‘not the best audience for promoting missile defence
cooperation’. Thus cooperation has remained at the stage of rhetoric.

In counter-terrorism, dialogue has been established and there are agreements to
establish cooperation between Russia and Europol. There have also been meetings
to discuss these issues in the Russia-COPS format and at expert level. Agreements
have focused on considering the conditions and detailed procedures for information
exchanges on terrorist networks, travel tickets of dubious authenticity, arms
supplies, suspect financial transactions and new forms of terrorist activity,
including connections to chemical, biological or nuclear threats. These agreements
are to be supplemented by enhanced cooperation in all relevant international and
regional fora, early signature and ratification of counter-terrorist conventions and
protocols, efforts to stop the financing of terrorism and early finalisation of the UN
Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism and the provision of
technical support to third countries.

Again, though, there are difficulties, and practical cooperation has not developed
far. Most Russian commentators believe that the EU simply does not have the
capabilities to deal with such threats as international terrorism, and its ideas on
terrorism remained on paper and merely declarative. The independent politician
Vladimir Ruizhkov pointed to the fact that Russia-EU cooperation against terrorism
was highly desirable, but the joint statements were abstract and there is little
precise or concrete content. The only specific measure mentioned was the promised
finalisation of the agreement between Europol and Russia on exchanging technical
and strategic information. For some Russian experts, counter-terrorist
cooperation with the USA was considered a greater priority. Ekaterina Stepanova
argued that by actively participating in the international counter-terrorist coalition,
Russia managed to associate itself directly with the USA, while circumventing
cumbersome Western bureaucracies such as NATO and the EU that seemed to find
themselves almost out of business during the first stages of the post-September 11
counter-terrorist operations. At one recent discussion on Russia, the EU and
international terrorism, reference to practical Russia-EU counter-terrorism
cooperation was notable only by its almost complete absence. Importantly, though,
experts were divided over the potential for cooperation. Some believed there to be
good grounds for Russia-EU cooperation in anti-terrorist operations, even greater
coincidence than between Russia and the USA. Others, however, argued that
Russia and the EU approached anti-terrorist operations differently. Russian
approaches are reactive and based on short-term punitive measures; EU approaches are longer-term, aimed at root causes.¹⁴

Russia-EU initiatives on preventing the proliferation of WMD also remain declarative, according to Russian experts. Practical cooperation is so low profile that it is hardly examined.¹⁵ This was for three main reasons. First, there is a lack of coordinating and cooperative mechanisms (and a lack of EU capabilities in this field). Second, there is little funding to support such projects – most money for WMD control comes from the USA, Canada and Japan. Third, and most importantly, there was a significant difference in priorities between Russia and the EU. For Russia the priorities are its rotting nuclear submarines, the stocks of plutonium, the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and finally safe storage of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), the main missing ingredient for terrorists wishing to make bombs. The EU’s priorities are different: the safe storage of HEU and the implementation of the CWC – since these could be connected with terrorism – followed by plutonium and lastly the submarines, since these were considered a more local issue. Thus, once again, the USA is considered by most Russian experts to be the key partner.

Cooperation in crisis management was for a long time cited by both sides as one of the most promising areas for Russia-EU security cooperation. In fact, this element of the security relationship is perhaps most problematic, and despite the Russian contribution to the EU’s mission in Macedonia and the invitation extended to Russia to be involved in the active phase of the joint EU-NATO crisis management exercise CME/CMX03 (as an observer, not as a partner), very little has happened. Here, there are four main problems in Russian perspectives. First, the EU is simply not ready as a military actor. For all the talk of ESDP becoming ‘big business’, and although it is now operational, it quite clearly remains in its early stages and Russian observers almost unanimously note that it is not ready for serious cooperation.

The current state of the Russian military is also considered to undermine practical cooperative projects. Although some argue that Russia could gather together forces to participate in Russia-EU operations, several leading Russian analysts have been remarkably sceptical. As one pithily declared, ‘if no-one is afraid of the Russian army as an opponent, then everyone is afraid of it as an ally because of the way that the Russian army fights, as shown in Chechnya’.¹⁶ There was widespread consensus, according to one expert, that Russia needed to conduct a radical reform of the structure of its armed forces before worthwhile cooperation with the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force could take place. This was particularly the case in terms of military preparation and technological equipment.¹⁷ Moreover, there needed to be a doctrinal change in the Russian armed forces, to heighten transparency and civilian control.¹⁸

Others point to a reluctance and scepticism, especially on the part of the Russian military, to engage in such cooperation. This was partly due to an institutional conservatism which created a certain ignorance about the EU as a military actor. The Russian military, some have argued, was not per se opposed to cooperation with the EU: the problem was that the EU remained terra incognita. The military could not see a perspective role for themselves in such cooperation. Furthermore, the two sides would have to interact, and this raised problems of transparency. Although there were positive moves in a broad general sense towards cooperation, in practical specifics such as joint training there was also reluctance, since it would emphasize problems within the Russian military system and expose it to criticism.
Yuri Fyodorov has been more graphic, however, stating with some vivacity that if there were no radical changes to the Russian military’s views and perceptions, it would be difficult for Russia to meet the West ‘until Judgement Day’. The military command is unable to adapt itself to the new strategic environment and fears that a transformation of the armed forces would undermine their departmental and personal influence and positions.19

Finally, even if either party had been materially ready for such operations, Russian experts discern two sets of problems at the level of interaction. Much preparatory work remains to be done to create effective mechanisms for consultation, joint decision-making, contingency planning and inter-operability. One problem of the cooperation in Macedonia was that it highlighted the lack of equality in such arrangements. Even on such a small scale, equality was not accorded to Russia. The EU has only one model of such operations, based on EU leadership. This question of equality and leadership needs resolution before there can be any further cooperation. But the EU’s position is very restrictive: EU procedures for non-EU state participation in EU military operations are complicated, effectively prohibiting joint operations. Russia might be asked to contribute forces, but would be unlikely to receive a special command arrangement as in Balkan operations with the UN and NATO during the 1990s. This also has obvious ramifications for notions of ‘equality’ and partnership which Russians hold to be a key point in the relationship. Thus some have pointed out that Russia-NATO agreements would be used should there be any political decision to undertake a joint Russia-EU operation.20

Furthermore, Russian approaches and methods of conflict prevention and operation in post-conflict situations differ greatly from Western norms. There is a conceptual gap – conflict prevention does not feature in Russian security debates, whereas for the EU it is a main issue. Moreover, Russian approaches are much more militarised than those of the EU.21 Russian and Western politicians, military representatives and experts need to overcome their disagreements, recognise their respective peace support approaches, perceive conflict situations from the other’s viewpoint and only then develop viable solutions.22 Quite simply, much conceptual work remains to be done.

**Russia-EU Soft Security Cooperation**

Until very recently, soft security cooperation has been largely overlooked by analysts. Nonetheless, it forms an important part of the security relationship. Discussion of soft security cooperation has featured noticeably in Russia-EU meetings, agreements and, latterly, joint statements. The PCA contained clauses referring to cooperation on environmental protection (Article 69), customs and illegal migration (Articles 78, 84) and against money laundering and drug smuggling (Articles 81, 82). The EU’s Common Strategy on Russia and Russia’s Mid-Term Strategy for Relations with the EU 2000-2010 developed this background further, highlighting judicial cooperation, and cooperation against organised crime, money laundering and illegal trafficking of drugs, and fixing cooperation in the field of law enforcement and the establishment of operative contacts. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov remarked that Russia and the EU had intensified their cooperation in the struggle against organised crime, the trafficking of drugs, arms and humans and money laundering. To this end, a mechanism of consultation was established, and contacts have taken place regularly at different levels.23 Analysts concurred. In the words of Olga Potyomkina, it was ‘beyond doubt that the fight against cross
Dr Andrew Monaghan

border crime, illegal migration and the partnership for border security should become top priority matters in the EU-Russia relationship.\textsuperscript{24}

A number of cooperative projects have been planned. The Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime (APCOC) focused on a number of clearly defined criminal activities, including the trafficking of drugs, human beings and stolen cars.\textsuperscript{25} Signed in April 2000, the plan aimed to consolidate and reinforce public institutions and the rule of law. APCOC incorporated two important initiatives for cooperation: the EU’s Drug Strategy (2000-2004) (EUDS) and Russia’s Special Federal Programme (1999-2000) to step up the fight against organised crime.\textsuperscript{26} There is also to be an exchange of technical, operational and strategic information between the appropriate law enforcement agencies as well as meetings of experts and training courses. Russia also changed legislation in the area of money laundering to facilitate cooperation with the EU, and in January 2004 President Putin underscored alterations to Russia’s Criminal Code which established liability for trafficking in human beings in principle criminalising such activities.

Projects to enhance border control have led to initiatives in Kaliningrad and Karelia, and began in 1996. Border posts have been established at the Sovetsk-Panemune and Pogranichny-Sudargas border crossings, and at Nida and Rybachiy on the coast of the Curonian Lagoon to provide a greater law enforcement presence and to improve cross-border capacity, infrastructure and operating conditions.\textsuperscript{27} On the Finnish border, two new crossing points were also established, one at Svetogorsk-Imatra, the other at Salla, with the expectation of their being fully operational by September 2001.\textsuperscript{28} Russian analysts have noted that the Russo-Finnish border was the most secure and technically and professionally well equipped of all Russia’s external borders, and that it facilitated the fine tuning of the technical details of Russia’s new Customs Code. Steps should be undertaken to and dissemination this positive experience, they argue.\textsuperscript{29}

Russian officials have also been positive about cross-border cooperation. Nikolai Kuznetsov, deputy commander of Border Guard Troops in Kaliningrad, considered cooperation to have been well-organised and successful, counting the detention of 2,014 illegal migrants attempting to cross into Western Europe in 2002. He also noted success in uncovering channels for illegal migration from third countries.\textsuperscript{30} Under the TACIS programme, the EU has also helped improve customs control procedures for both freight and passengers, provided equipment for a customs laboratory, and provided for some legal reforms and initiatives such as the training of judges.\textsuperscript{31}

A number of projects for Russia-EU cooperation in the field of nuclear safety also exist. The first major venture was the Lepse Project, initiated in 1994, and developed to address the problem of the Russian nuclear waste storage ship Lepse. An EU TACIS expert panel dedicated US$18.5 million to provide technical solutions. A further TACIS project for radioactive waste management in North-West Russia was completed in 2000. This aimed to assess potential sites for the disposal of radioactive waste in the Murmansk and Archangelsk regions and the Novaya Zemlya area. The concept was based on building an underground waste storage facility. On the basis of the results of the study, the Russian authorities were discussing the possible future location of the facility: three possible sites had been identified, according to the EU.\textsuperscript{32} A special grant facility within the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) established the Nuclear Safety Account. This provided grants for safety upgrades in the Kola and Leningrad nuclear plants of ECU 45 and 30 million respectively.\textsuperscript{33} The EU is one of the main
Western donors and is actively involved in the Contact Expert Group for an Overall Strategy for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management.

A partnership aiming to address environmental 'hot spots' has also developed. Priority was to be given to the Russian regions of Archangel, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod and Pskov. The establishment of a fund for this environmental partnership was a very important step, according to Yuri Deryabin, Special Ambassador of Russia. Priority was to be given to the Russian regions of Archangel, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod and Pskov. A series of projects have already been included in the framework of the EU's Northern Dimension. Deryabin noted that one of the most important of these was the reconstruction of waste cleaning facilities in St Petersburg region, the completion of which would demonstrate the practical value of the ND. EU TACIS programmes also funded a number of other environmental projects in North-West Russia, including EUR 201,000 for leachate pollution management in the Baltic Sea at St Petersburg (1998) and EUR 220,000 for the eco-auditing of St Petersburg under the Life Third Countries Programme for St Petersburg and Kaliningrad. The TACIS Cross-Border Programme afforded EUR 5 million for protected area management and water and waste water management projects in Karelia (2000).

However, a number of problems have prevented soft security cooperation from developing effectively. The EU has not been a positive partner in developing the relationship according to Russian experts. The scale of EU financial assistance has been small according to some, allowing for little more than small pilot projects rather than major changes to Russian norms and processes for dealing with internal security challenges. Compounding this, the slim financial resources have been ineffectively used, with money being siphoned off as kick-backs and to line the pockets of foreign consultants. Moreover, the effective implementation of projects has been hindered by the complexity of the Brussels bureaucracy and legislation and a lack of inter-operability between different EU programmes and projects. The plans were considered to be imprecise and to treat Russia as an undifferentiated space. In fact, Russian experts note that the EU does not seek to actively cooperate with leading Russian environmentalists, and appoints 'yes men' who would not rock the boat. These appointees were considered unprofessional, inexperienced and unresponsive to Russian requirements. This has resulted in the EU alienating relevant Russian expertise.

Furthermore, a number of Russian domestic problems have hindered cooperation. Federal institutional confusion created problems of information gathering, responsibility and funding. Constant, but slow, reform of the relevant ministries and repeated reorganisation of the Federal Migration Service undermined the ability of these organs to effectively implement policy. The dismantling of the Environmental Administration and its merger with the Ministry for Natural Resources, and the dismantling of the Ministry for Nationality Policy (which dealt with migration) and its merger into the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Foreign Ministry (MID) undermined the ability to tackle environmental and legal issues coherently. The MID itself was also short of funding and qualified personnel. So despite being formally empowered to coordinate various departments, its ability to conduct and supervise international negotiations on the wide range of environmental projects in which Russia was involved was limited. Such reorganisation on a federal level required a subsequent reorganisation on the regional level which took longer and required new resources. The resulting confusion meant that existing information concerning the nature and gravity of soft security problems was unreliable, and it was unclear who was responsible for a
given problem. It was difficult to find the appropriate party with whom to deal, according to Lomagin. These problems were aggravated by the fact that so little money was allocated in the Russian budget to resolving these issues.40

Legislative barriers have hindered international cooperation. These included heavy taxation of foreign investment funds and lack of consensus on responsibility in case of accident (this hindered the Lepse project particularly, which stalled by the end of 2001 largely as a result of these difficulties). Although the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme for Russia, agreed to and signed in Stockholm on 21 May 2003, provides a framework which could serve to resolve such problems, its negotiations were difficult, and it remains to be seen whether it will be really effective. Also, the legal bases for dealing with some of these problems have proved inadequate: Russia did not have appropriate basic laws and norms for dealing with illegal migration, relying instead on a modified but inappropriate version of a Soviet law passed in 1981.

There is also a dialogue disconnect between Russia and the EU. In many cases, quite simply, the EU prioritises soft security questions and Moscow does not. On issues such as environmental protection, there is a difference in emphasis. Russian experts argue that soft security challenges such as ecological security remain the ideology of wealthy countries. Most EU member states, particularly those that prioritise environmental security, are politically and economically stable and able to focus on such issues. Russia, by contrast, has not been politically or economically stable for much of the time since 1991, and the Russian government has had many other calls on its time and resources. The environment has simply been pushed down the agenda. Much the same has been the case with the low prioritisation of HIV/AIDS in Russia. Russia’s position on soft security matters has often fluctuated between interest and almost complete ambivalence, and often interest has remained merely rhetorical. The low prioritisation of soft security matters is reflected in budgetary commitments – they remain badly financed by the Russian government, and budget allocations are rarely disbursed in full. Military security remains the predominant focus and will continue to be so in the near future.41

If it can be said that soft security is simply not considered by many in the Russian government to be very important, it is also clear that there is little political drive to address such problems. Soft security issues require long term attention. It is difficult to have visible results in two to three years, so it is not politically profitable to attend to them seriously – other issues are simply more politically attractive. Moreover, soft security debates are often more about scoring political points rather than really attending to a problem. Sergei Medvedev therefore noted that it was only those aspects of the soft security agenda which offer short-term political dividends that are put forward, even though their actual importance may be secondary.42

Finally, Russian analysts have argued that this was not a cooperative partnership because of a fundamental asymmetry: the EU viewed Russia as a source of soft security threats such as drug trafficking and immigration. Russia on the other hand viewed itself to be a victim rather than a source of such threats, being a transit route for drugs and illegal migrants, rather than a primary source of them. Soft security threats to Russia emanated particularly from Russia’s own south and south-eastern areas.43 Sergei Kortunov summed up the views of many Russian experts when he noted that Europe ‘should decide ... whether Russia is a partner or a source of potential threat’. Why does Europe detect only bad things in Russia
and describe them in the media with barely concealed superiority bordering on racism?' he asked.\textsuperscript{44} Practically, this attitude hindered the fight against organised crime, Potyomkina claimed, since it was difficult to cooperate in combating crime if the hunt for the criminal stopped at the Schengen border.\textsuperscript{45} This asymmetry prevented real cooperation as partners. ‘Cooperation’ was seen as one-sided – intended to improve EU security, but not that of Russia. Such attitudes are souring the atmosphere. Antonenko asserted that the EU ‘generates resentment on the part of the Russian government and its politicians’ by pointing the finger at Russia for being a source of criminality. This, she argued, was considered to be a speculative, overstated stereotype, based on prejudice. Russian politicians saw the European fixation with the Russia mafia as a strategy to undermine Russia’s international image, distance Russia from Europe and pass on the blame for failures in European policies such as addressing drug consumption.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{Conclusions}

A series of fundamental problems therefore can be seen to beset the relationship, preventing the conversion of the rhetoric of strategic partnership into cooperative action. As with the overall Russia-EU relationship, plans exist, but very little of real substance has taken place. Cooperation has been problematic and low profile – and, frankly, on a very small scale. Despite the heavily institutionalised framework, agreements and plans have often been hurried, leading to unsatisfactory compromises and hollow projects. The Russia-EU relationship has therefore been the subject of some serious idiomatic inflation: of being a ‘strategic partnership’, and of establishing ‘deep practical cooperation’. In fact, in Russian perspectives, the relationship is neither strategic (since there is no coherent long term goal) nor a partnership (since the EU does not treat Russia as an equal partner, rather as a source of threats).

Dmitri Danilov has noted that it was this continuing ‘pressing need for a long-term strategy to reflect changes taking place in Europe and international relations more broadly’ which led Russia and the EU to begin the Four Common Spaces plans at the May 2003 Summit. Nonetheless, the Common Spaces and Road Maps were not the solution: he argued that ‘Russia and the EU still have not formulated the long-term goals of their ‘strategic partnership’. They have different ideas of the content of the Four Spaces.\textsuperscript{47} The belated signing of the Road Maps of the Four Common Spaces in May 2005 has done little to improve the situation in Russian perspectives.\textsuperscript{48} Senior Russian officials note that the EU still does not know what to do with Russia.\textsuperscript{49} Russian analysts also note that the main problem of Russia’s EU policy is the absence of a strategic vision concerning its place in the pan-European context.\textsuperscript{50} Indeed analysts are almost unanimous in criticising the Road Maps for being vague, for failing to address the value differences and for ducking the main action points.\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, Russian experts argue that the work on the Four Spaces has only created a false impression of progress in bilateral relations and thus undermines stimuli for creating and implementing specific projects.\textsuperscript{52}

There are fundamental differences in approach both to the relationship and to security problems. The fact that the EU and Russia are both different types of actor with different aims and values has been clear for some time, and needs little further development here.\textsuperscript{53} Briefly, though, the EU approaches the relationship seeking to improve the level and quality of cooperation with Russia by leading Moscow closer to Europe and therefore imposing on Russia its logic of expanding the integrated European space based on EU standards. Moscow has espoused a different
approach – emphasising partnership based on mutual rapprochement and proceeding from the interests of each side.\textsuperscript{54} The importance of common values in the relationship is also clear: values provide the glue which holds a relationship together when interests do not coincide.\textsuperscript{55} Russia and the EU, despite happy words, do not currently share common values.

This is particularly salient since, as illustrated above, Russia and the EU share very few really coincidental interests in either the military or soft security relationship. The security dimension of the relationship is the one area in overall Russia-EU relations where Moscow believes it can act in equal partnership with the EU. However, the relationship is not developing as a partnership of equals, according to Russian experts: Russia is treated as the source of security threats (in nuclear waste and organised crime, for example) or as a junior partner with too little real input (in the case of crisis management operations). Interests are often best fulfilled by other partners, or represent broad common goals at a superficial level. In some cases interests are more in conflict. An example of this in soft security is environmental protection. It is a high priority for the EU, but not for Russia which currently prioritises the exploitation of its natural resources for economic growth. Crisis management is another example of where apparently coincidental interests are in fact potentially more competitive than cooperative, since in the former Soviet space Russia and the EU are more akin to being rivals than partners. Aims simply differ: Russia wants the EU to ease off its involvement in Moldova, Chechnya and Georgia, but the EU wants to become more involved and active. Leading Russian analysts note that all elements of the Russian decision-making chain – the President, the MID, the MO and legislature – consider the territory of the former Soviet Union to be exclusively an area of Russian influence and have not viewed the intervention of foreign soldiers there at all positively.\textsuperscript{56}

The divergence of values and lack of substantial common interests is made more problematic by the fact that there are very few on either side who are actively interested in establishing cooperation. The main drive on the Russian side to establish a relationship has come from President Putin and the Presidential Administration.\textsuperscript{57} The recent establishment of an autonomous department for EU-Russia relations with extensive competencies in the Presidential Administration suggests that the relationship remains one of Putin’s key priorities.\textsuperscript{58}

However, significant elements of the elites of both parties are not interested in establishing an active practical relationship, indeed they may even oppose one. This renders the relationship more fragile and makes establishing and developing practical cooperation that much more difficult. It was highlighted above that Russian analysts are critical of the role the EU plays in the relationship. They have been equally critical of the Russian side. One recent report stated that it was the ‘unanimous opinion’ of the workshop participants that ‘Russian official bodies engaged in routine interaction with the EU need to seriously improve their work’. This was to be achieved by increasing personnel and funds, improving personnel skills, implementing structural changes and better coordinating Russia’s EU policy.\textsuperscript{59} Such claims are justifiable. The MID’s resources devoted to coordinating political and security relations with the EU are remarkably small: its EU department is just four strong. It should certainly be bolstered.

In wider terms, the approach of the Russian establishment, particularly the MID and the MO, to relations with the EU is considered conservative, and to hinder both the development of policies and the implementation of cooperative projects. According to some experts, the development of the relationship therefore depends
on the Presidential Administration chivvying the relevant ministries, particularly the MID.

Moreover, there is little official conceptual support for developing a relationship with the EU. The major advisory organs in the Russian decision-making chain, such as the Security Council (SC), have not focused on the EU. It is difficult to see any direct influence – or indeed involvement – of the SC on relations with the EU. Secretaries of the SC have met leaders of the EU: Javier Solana met Vladimir Rushailo on his visit to Moscow in April 2001. However, the EU has not featured in SC discussions since 2000, the period when Russia-EU relations have begun to gather momentum. It does not seem likely to influence relations greatly in the near future, either, since there are very few experts on Europe among the personnel of the SC’s research committee.

Lobbies also fail to drive the security relationship at the grass roots level on the Russian side. Relevant expertise, such as the environmental movement, has lost much ground in the Russian decision-making mechanism since Putin came to power, serving to undermine the ability both to forward soft security issues and implement projects effectively. Much of the theoretical underpinning of a relationship with the EU comes from a non-governmental academic and think tank base which does not have a direct institutionalised line into the most important decision-making strata. Also, some of the leading research institutes hardly focus on Europe or the EU, concentrating instead on other priorities. Knowledge of the EU exists but in only a limited sense – often the knowledge is not used efficiently nor passed along the decision-making chain. It is also fragmented and competitive. Middle-level experts may grasp the problems and facets of the relationship, but their voices are not heard above the clamour of others, and do not break into either the popular or middle-level official conscious. A number of analysts have argued therefore that the situation in Russia is such that effective understanding of the EU, and particularly its decision-making processes, is absent. This inevitably hinders the potential for developing a substantial, cooperative relationship.

The Small Steps Approach

So there is clearly a complex web of problems in the relationship. But Russia-EU relations have come far – so often the main achievement is overlooked: the confrontation of the Cold War era is ended. Fifteen years ago, few might have predicted that there would have been official proclamations of a Russia-EU ‘strategic partnership’, however hollow, and fewer would have predicted that Russian militiamen would have been working alongside those of the EU on an active deployment – however symbolic such a deployment might be. Indeed, the relationship has come much further than simply being no longer confrontational. Progress should not be exaggerated, but neither should the negative side. The conversion of a hostile confrontation into a cooperative relationship takes time and involves lengthy (usually many years), complex and frequently difficult negotiations. Even when the agreements have been signed, negotiations on particular points within the framework of the new relationship often take many more months or years to resolve – if indeed they ever are fully resolved. Many analysts write off the agreements and mutual strategies of the mid-to-late 1990s for being too little, conflicting or out-dated even by the time they came into force. At the time, however, the most important point was they had been signed at all. These are foundations which can be built upon. If the language of the Russia-EU 'strategic
partnership' remains in the future conditional tense, it at least is not in the past perfect.

However, it is also evident that, as one leading western analyst has put it, ‘before enlargement, Russia-EU relations had seemed generally positive if prone to friction. This has been reversed, with relations in some areas becoming generally frictional and occasionally positive’.65 This makes it all the more necessary to begin to establish practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest – rather than the interest of one side only – and to establish a bank of success stories of practical cooperation. And this is becoming the central focus of the official approaches of both sides – the EU, according to Danilov, has begun to prefer concrete results over excessive institutionalisation, while Moscow has stated that a policy of small steps in the formation of a common security space should not be ruled out.66

A number of areas stand out as possibilities for establishing a bank of successful cooperative projects. The first is in civil defence and emergencies. In 2002, Moscow suggested a new field of cooperation – the establishment of a Pan-European Centre for Disaster Management. The suggestion first appeared in a joint statement in 2002, as both sides agreed to discuss specific aspects of cooperation in conducting search and rescue operations in response to natural disasters.67 It was more formally proposed in April 2003. The Russian suggestion was to integrate the centre into the ESDP and develop and strengthen the centre’s capabilities through contributions of advanced disaster management technology by major European states and their dissemination on the basis of the EU’s decisions. The principal threats included seasonal forest fires, river flooding, volcanic activity and explosions and fires at hazardous industrial transport, energy, and military sites. Factors such as climate change, intensification of industry and terrorism aggravated the risk of such disasters. The centre should comprise air mobile forces deployable within four to eight hours. Russia proposed the creation of a special aviation pool, and offered Russian-made Mi-26, Mi-8, Ka-32 helicopters, Il-76 heavy airlift and Be200ChS multi-purpose amphibious aircraft and their crews for use in this squadron. Russia also offered other technology, including the MANTIS mobile laboratory for detection of defects in buildings affected by seismic activity, explosions and floods. Yuri Brazhnikov, deputy minister for civil defence, argued that such proposals met the needs of the relationship: such problems were clearly beyond the capabilities of EU member states, and the EU lacked such a mechanism.68 Although it is still early and details need to be worked out, some practical progress has been made – Russian equipment has been successfully tested to European standards, and the atmosphere of negotiations has been positive. Such cooperation represents a small but concrete step. It is worth noting, however, that there is very little published Russian expert coverage of this field of cooperation – this should be pursued further.

Second, certain areas of soft security have clearly become priorities. With the extension of the Russia-EU border, border control cooperation becomes a necessary area for further and enhanced collaboration. If positive tactical-level experiences of the Finland and Kaliningrad border can be reproduced, this would be a promising step. The Road Maps state that the APCOC, which has effectively lain dormant since 2000, is to be resuscitated. The UK is seeking to find common ground with Russia in this field during its presidency, and to develop cooperation against organised crime. A third area of import is in addressing the challenges posed by communicable diseases. The threats posed by HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis pose major challenges to both Russia and the EU.69 There has been some cooperation in this field already. The EU established a North-West health project for the Russian
regions of Kaliningrad, Murmansk and Archangelsk regions. Its aim was to help to reform the Russian health system, facilitate exchanges of knowledge and information between Russian and EU experts and establish close cooperation in controlling and preventing communicable diseases. Two million Euros from the EU’s TACIS programme were allocated for the project. Projects to enhance treatment and prevention of AIDS were also established. The foundation of a special centre with branches in Klaipeda and Kaliningrad was also part of a project to coordinate efforts to treat and prevent AIDS. Despite the scale of the problem – some leading experts in Russia and the EU consider that AIDS is approaching pandemic proportions in Russia, with Kaliningrad particularly affected – this dimension of the relationship has received almost no attention. This must change. In the future the problem will continue to grow, and may become entangled with other aspects of the relationship such as visa status and the free movement of citizens. This would magnify the problem itself and could become a major thorn in the side of the overall Russia-EU relationship. It should be addressed now rather than later.

Successful cooperation should be widely and effectively publicised. Most analysis of the relationship remains superficial, rarely progressing beyond the basics of the PCA and Four Common Spaces and a reiteration of the values gap. There is little developed examination of more detailed aspects of the relationship. Amongst the cacophony of criticism of the Road Maps, few have examined other progress made of late, for example the establishment of human rights consultations (welcomed by both sides, and a potentially very significant step), increased EU cooperation in the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus (with Putin’s approval) and the more frequent convening of the Permanent Partnership Council. These are smaller steps than the Road Maps, to be sure, but are also important steps and should be developed further. The main priorities of the UK Presidency of the EU are to begin to implement the plans effectively. Optimism should be restrained, but the official Russian response to the British approach so far has been positive. Moreover, the UK has a range of cooperative bilateral projects with Russia which could serve as a useful basis for translating into Russia-EU projects. The results should be carefully monitored over the next six months. As EU Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner recently stated, ‘we must not let this chance for a more effective relationship slip through our fingers’.

ENDNOTES

1 For much of the 1990s, the EU was considered to represent the ‘good West’ while NATO represented the ‘bad West’.
5 COPS is the main organ for coordinating decision taking in ESDP, consisting of a committee of appointed ambassadors from member states.
The EU has no real need for Russian imagery, however, and the results of transactions which have taken place have not been considered very reliable. Webber, M, 'Third Party Inclusion in European Security and Defence Policy: a Case Study of Russia', European Foreign Affairs Review, No 6, 2001.

Again, from the EU side, there have been a number of objections. The EU rejected Russia’s offer of strategic airlift for use in Afghanistan in 2001 on two grounds. First, the price asked was deemed excessive. Second, Russia set unacceptable political limits on the use of the aircraft, restricting the distribution of humanitarian assistance to only the area controlled by the Northern Alliance. Moreover, the EU has its own priority project, and is attempting to develop its own capabilities in this area – the A400M. Lynch, D, Russia Faces Europe: the Prospects for Strategic Alignment, Chaillot Paper No 60, Paris: ISS, 2003, p70.


This is in contrast to the EU position. EU officials note that there has indeed been positive progress in this field, and that Moscow also is positive about such cooperation. See also EU-side analysis of the cooperation in Schmitt, B, (ed), EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia, Chaillot Paper No 61, Paris: ISS, 2003, www.iss-eu.org.


Baranovsky, in ibid, p57.


Nikitin, A, Mirotvorcheshkiye operatsii, parlamenty, i zakonodatelstvo, Moscow: Centre for Political and International Affairs, 2004, pp8, 13.


For further details, see www.europa.eu.int.

EUDS sought to reduce over five years the prevalence of drug use, particularly among those under the age of 18 years, the availability of drugs, and the amount of drug-related crime. It also focused on the reduction of the incidence of drug related health damage, such as HIV, Hepatitis B & C. The Russian Special Federal Programme was approved by the Russian Federal Assembly on 10 March 1999. It sought to intensify the fight against organised crime by reforming the criminal justice and law enforcement system, increasing financial controls, suppressing corruption, and developing international cooperation.


Sergounin, *Russia and the EU: The ND*.


Deryabin, ‘Severnoye izmereniye’.


Antonenko in Antonenko & Pinninck (eds), p5.

The subsumption of the Environmental Administration into its competitor, the ministry for the exploitation of the environment, reflects the low prioritisation of environmental issues in Russian official circles.

Lomagin, ‘Soft Security Problems in North West Russia’.


Antonenko, in Antonenko & Pinninck, (eds), pp14-7, 26, (emphasis added).


Potemkina, O, ‘Reason or Political Kitsch?’, *Russia on Russia*, No 7, 2002, p76.


Officials note that the Road Maps are very important for both Russia and the EU as they set the agenda for partnership in the coming years. The May summit was to ‘re-launch an ambitious and focused EU/Russia strategic partnership’, and the Road Maps ‘contain agreed, detailed objectives for cooperation, as well as specific actions to be taken by the EU or Russia in order to attain these objectives’. EU-Russia Summit, 10 May 2005, www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/ip05_522.htm.


See, for example, Emerson, M, *Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy*, CEPS Policy Brief, No 71, May 2005.

‘Russia-EU Relations: the Present Situation and Prospects’.

For one of the most emphatic descriptions of the normative and value differences, see Vahl, M, *Just Good Friends? The EU-Russian “Strategic Partnership” and the Northern Dimension*, CEPS Working Document No 166, Brussels: CEPS, 2001.

Danilov, ‘Russia and European Security’, p89.


In some respects, this is a good thing – the President is the key element in the Russian decision-making chain and the one element that can really push through initiatives. However, one EU expert has noted that this arrangement has downsides. All
negotiations must be referred back to the President, slowing the process down. Also, since
the Presidential Administration has only limited resources, it simply cannot attend to all the
important points in the relationship.

58 It should be noted, though, that EU officials have not yet felt any positive impact of
this. Indeed when asked about it, few knew of its existence.
59 ‘Russia-EU Relations: the Present Situation and Prospects’.
62 Most are experts on Russia-USA relations. The only member who might be
considered to know about the EU is Sergei Karaganov – and it is worth remembering his
negative comments about the EU noted above,
64 Shemyatenkov, V, ‘Ten Years of Formal Relations between the EU and the Former
Europeiskiy soyuq i Rossia, St Petersburg: 1999, pp3-4.
67 Joint Declaration following May 2002 Summit, Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, No 6, 2002,
p60.
68 ‘Disaster Management centres to be formed in Europe on Russian initiative’, Interfax
AVN, 2 September 2004.
69 Considering the scale of the problem, particularly in Russia, which many consider to
be approaching pandemic status, there is remarkably little analysis of this problem. For a
brief but interesting overview of impact HIV/AIDS is having on the Russian population and
will have on the Russian economy, see Lomagin, ‘Forming a New Security Identity in Modern
Russia’, op cit. HIV/AIDS and TB are two of the highest profile diseases, but others also
pose potential problems, and areas for cooperation. Recent examples include the spread of
Bird Flu, foot and mouth, anthrax and swine fever. These diseases have spread from Asia
and the Far East to Siberia through the migration of birds and livestock. Russian
authorities have begun to take measures such as the quarantine and slaughter of poultry
and the inoculation of soldiers who are participating in exercises with China. Nonetheless,
the Russian Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergencies has warned that bird flu could
spread to European Russia during August when birds migrate from Siberia to the Black and
Caspian Seas. At present, it seems most likely to be costly in economic terms with the
slaughter of poultry; but a major concern is that the virus might mutate into a form that
could spread from human to human. The EU should consider how it could provide
assistance to the Russian Health Service in countering such diseases also. “Russia to Give
Bird Flu Shots to Troops Participating in Chinese War Games”, Mosnews, 2 August 2005;
69 Sergounin, A, Russia and the European Union: The Case of Kaliningrad, PONARS
70 Danilov noted that one reason for the growing mutual discord in the relationship was
the politicisation of issues on the bilateral agenda. Danilov, ‘Russia and European
Security’, pp87-8. The establishment of this human rights consultation mechanism has
had the opposite effect – by depoliticising this sensitive issue, it facilitated what both sides
saw as a positive meeting.
71 For further analysis of the UK Presidency and Russia-EU relations, see the author’s
‘EU-Russia Relations During the British Presidency: From Plans to Substance?’,
72 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/ip05_375.htm
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ISBN 1-905058-33-0